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It is precisely the 
transcendent, the holy, the 
other disciplines of thought. 
CHAPTER I 
REVELATION 
focus upon the experience of the divine, the 
numinous, which distinguishes theology from all 
Whether a theologian is concerned with the role 
of the transcendent in aspects of human knowing, the historical critical and 
literary analysis of Scripture, or the ramifications of humanity's ethical 
choices upon the integrity of the environment, there must be some reference 
to the divine or else it would not qualify as theo- logy. I will use the term 
"revelation" bee a use it has traditionally been understood as the 
. communication or mediation of experiences of the divine. The word is derived 
' from the Latin verb revel are, the past participle, revelatus m e an in g 
unveiled, uncovered, or revealed. Why is the unveiling of the divine an 
essential element of theology? 
First, the very comprehension of another's theological reflection 
depends upon one's ability to recognize those elements of thought which 
reveal aspects of the divine. These aspects of revelation are the primary 
cornerstones upon which the rest of theological thought can be built. The 
following statement will serve as an example: God is love; therefore we should 
care for our neighbor. Questions that directly relate to aspects of revelation 
1 
2 
are primary, i.e. Why is God love? What is love? How are the two related? 
Questions that relate to the corresponding effects and implications are 
secondary, i.e. Why should we care for our neighbor? Who is our neighbor? 
In attempting to provide an answer to the question, Why should we care for 
our neighbor?, it is first necessary to understand why God is love and what we 
mean by love. Likewise, in attempting to understand theological thought, it is 
first necessary to grasp the underlying fundamental elements of revelation. 
Secondly, the act of constructing theological reflection, also demands that one 
be able to recognize the elements of revelation in experience. The 
identification of revelation in experience is essential if one hopes to construct 
critical, theological thought. Thus, this focus on revelation is essential in the 
development of one's ability to understand and analyze as well as to construct 
theological thought. 
In this thesis, I will provide an analysis of aspects of revelation in the 
thought of Paul Tillich and Wolfhart Pannenberg. There are two primary 
' reasons why I have chosen to focus on these two theologians. First, their 
thought is still an active element within contemporary theological discussion. 
Thus, I hope my research will function as a helpful contribution to this 
discussion. Second, both focus on different aspects of revelation which I hope 
to demonstrate, if brought together, would provide a more complete 
understanding of the experience of revelation. 
I will attempt this analysis with the following two objectives in mind. 
First, I hope to provide an explication of the significant aspects of revelation 
in the thought of both Tillich and Pannenberg which will provide the 
necessary foundation from which a more authentic understanding of their 
thought can be achieved. Second, by focusing on aspects of revelation in the 
3 
thought of both Tillich and Pannenberg, I will attempt to construct a fuller, 
more adequate understanding of the experience of revelation. 
It will be helpful if I first provide a general analysis of revelation. I 
will begin by attempting a brief overview of various ways revelation has been 
understood by focusing on Avery Dulles' Models of Revelation. By starting 
with Dulles' broad survey of revelation, I hope to establish some breadth in the 
horizon of significant elements and issues involved in the thought about 
revelation as a topic in Christian theology. Second, I will rely on the thought 
of John Baillie in his book The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought and 
attempt to provide a brief historical outline of some of the significant 
developments in the thought of revelation that will give some historical 
perspective to our continuing discussion of revelation as well as to establish 
the historical location of Tillich and Pannenberg that will be essential in the 
analysis of their thought that will follow. Third, I will tum to the thought of 
H. Richard Niebuhr in his book The Meaning of Revelation and attempt to 
' establish some depth in the horizon by identifying some of the significant 
. historical elements involved in revelation. Fourth, I will focus on the thought 
of John Macquarrie in his book Principles of Christian Theology and attempt 
;._ } 
to give some depth to existential and ontological elements of revelation. Fifth, 
r,.· 
I will analyze the thought of Gordon D. Kaufman in his book Systematic 
Theology: A Historicist Perspective highlighting some of the important 
interrelations involved in thinking about revelation. Finally, I will turn to 
the thought of Michael L. Cook, S.J., in his article "Revelation as Metaphoric 
Process" and attempt to identify some of the more detailied elements involved 
in the interrelations that Kaufman suggests. By providing both a general 
description of the historical situation in which Tillich and Pannenberg are 
4 
involved, as well as focusing on the significant issues and problems that exist 
in examining the general notion of revelation, I hope to provide a more 
thorough analysis of their thought which will contribute to a better 
understanding of theological thought today. 
Typoloiical Suryey 
In his book, Models of Revelation, Avery Dulles provides five 
distinct models to account for the ways revelation has been understood. He 
uses the criteria of how and where revelation occurs to establish the general 
parameters of his models. Dulles maintains that a typological analysis of 
revelation may be helpful in attempting to understand revelation in the 
complex plurality of our times, but cautions against the uncritical placement 
of a theologian's thought within a particular model. He suggests that a variety 
of models, as in physics, may be necessary in order to account for the complex 
'and diverse experience of revelation adequately. 
In Dulles' first model, revelation is characterized as doctrine. Doctrine 
is traditionally understood as a formal teaching or statement of belief. Dulles 
also refers to this model as the "propositional" model which indicates the act of 
expressing doctrine, or what is to be believed. This model suggests that 
revelation does occur in nature, but as a result of the transcendence of God and 
the reality of human sin, a special source of revelation is necessary. Thus, a 
supernatural conception of revelation is a characteristic element of this 
model. For Christians accepting this model, Jesus Christ as well as the Bible are 
thought to be sources of this supernatural revelation. "What God has revealed, 
they insist, is truth and is capable of being communicated to human minds 
5 
through articulate speech." 1 This model maintains that authoritatively 
formulated dogma and aspects of tradition are understood to be divinely 
revealed truth. The proper response to this understanding of revelation is 
faithful assent to truth understood to be revealed in authoritative sources. It is 
understood that the Holy Spirit, working in the heart of believers, is an 
important element in this process.2 The Holy Spirit allows the believer to 
grasp divine truth. The primary advantage of this model is in its recognition 
of the importance of tradition as an interpretive medium. A significant 
disadvantage is its failure to understand and speak meaningfully to much of 
human experience. 
In his second model, revelation is understood as history. There are 
varying degrees to which the proponents of this model identify revelation 
with history. Dulles remarks that Pannenberg argues for the closest 
identification of history and revelation. Pannenberg rejects the nineteenth-
century salvation school, also represented by this model, as being inconsistent 
. : and stopping halfway. For him revelation is not to be found in a special 
1 • segment of history but rather is universal history. In his view, revelation is 
understood to be deeds and events rather than words. Information within 
·doctrine and the Bible is understood as signposts and documentation rather 
than revelation. 3 Pannenberg understands God to be revealed in and through 
the events of history. By stressing that it is the events themselves which 
carry what is necessary for revelation to take place, Pannenberg attempts to 
overcome the dichotomy between event and interpretation. "When the events 
1 Avery Dulles, S.J., Models of Revelation (New York: Doubleday, 1983), p. 39. 
2/bid., p. 46. 
3/bid., p. 54. 
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are taken seriously for what they are, and in the historical context to which 
they belong, then they speak their own language, the language of facts."4 As 
we shall see, the historical events, for Pannenberg, are "self-interpreting." 
What is needed to grasp revelation is the use of ones natural reason directed at 
the universal events of history. By "universal" Pannenberg means the entire 
history of the world as it moves ahead toward its final aim. Faith is not 
required for understanding revelation, but rather it is revelation encountered 
within universal history which brings about faith. These elements of 
Pannenberg's thought represent significant aspects of the second model 
which are important in Dulles' analysis of revelation understood as history. 
Later we shall analyize these elements of Pannenberg's thought as well as a 
variety of others · that are essential in understanding his conception of 
revelation as history. For now it is important to keep in mind the typological 
placement of Pannenberg's thought in Dulles' schema so that we may more 
objectively question the veracity and integrity of his view by grasping its 
distinctions as well as similarities with the various elements of Dulles' five 
models of revelation. A significant value of this model is its ability to capture 
the richness of revelation by referring to historical events rather than mere 
words. However, "it commonly neglects the factors which control the 
selection and interpretation of past events on the part of the biblical writers 
or the Church ... 5 
Dulles' third model understands revelation as inner experience. By 
stressing an internal, personal understanding of revelation, this model is free 
from theories that describe mediation. 
4Jbid., p. 59. 
5/bid., p. 123. 
"The content of revelation in this 
7 
model, is neither information about the past nor abstract doctrinal truth. 
Rather, the content is God as he lovingly communicates himself to the soul that 
is open to him. "6 A primary characteristic of this model is that revelation 
exists as an experience and not only as an idea. A value of this model is its 
insistence that what matters is not deeds or words, but God himself. However, 
this model has a difficult time attempting to communicate this transcendent 
experience of God. 
The fourth model understands revelation as a dialectical presence. This 
model stresses that as a result of divine transcendence and human sinfulness, 
God's presence and activity can never be immediately discovered in doctrinal 
statements, historical fact, or religious experience. Yet, at the same time, it is 
convinced that God, through faith, can choose to present himself to us in 
language, history, and experience. This model is characterized by the mystery 
of a simultaneous yes and no. The stress is on the will and choice of God. 
Whereas in the model of history, faith is a result of revelation, this model 
: maintains that faith is the essential requirement in order for revelation to 
, take place. The primary value of this model lies in its reminder of the distance 
·between us and God. Also, it illustrates our sinfulness and constant need for 
; .humility and forgiveness. A problem with this model, resulting from its 
' . ~ 
,. 
contradictory 
message.7 
statements, is its inability to provide a coherent, intelligible 
The fifth and final model understands revelation as new awareness. In 
this model, revelation is not understood as outside or separate but occurs 
rather "when human powers are raised to their highest pitch of activity. 
6/bid., p. 77. 
1/bid., p. 123. 
8 
Rather than going beyond experience, revelation is itself an experience of 
participation in divine life. "8 This model views God as the horizon of religious 
experience rather than as the object. "The form of revelation in this model is 
that of a breakthrough into a more advanced stage of human consciousness, 
such that the self is experienced as constituted and empowered by the divine 
presence ... 9 In referring to Tillich, Dulles says, "Revelation, for him, did not 
derive from experience as a source, but it could not occur unless mediated by 
experience." 1 O According to the doctrinal model, the word and dogma are 
sources of revelation. The historical model emphasizes that it is history itself 
which is the source of revelation. This model differs from both of these in that 
it stresses the source of revelation is God while maintaining that the medium 
of its mediation is human experience. Tillich certainly maintains this position 
but does so through the use of ontological categories. For Tillich, what is 
mediated through all aspects of reality (i.e. doctrine, history, language, people, 
events, etc.) is being-itself. Being grasped by being-itself mediating through 
: some aspect of reality, humanity is faced with an ultimate concern. By 
' , , representing the primary characteristics of the fifth model of revelation, 
, ·Tillich functions as an important element in Dulles' schema. In the following 
• 
1
chapter we shall see, in detail, Tillich's understanding of revelation as ultimate 
, ~ ... 
concern. For now, it is important to keep in mind that Dulles uses Tillich's 
thought to illustrate the general parameters of his fifth model of revelation as 
new awareness. We should keep the aspects of Dulles' other models in mind in 
analyizing Tillich so that we may consider aspects of his thought which he 
8/bid., p. 98. 
9/bid., p. 109. 
IO/bid., p. 102. 
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may not necessarily consider. In this way it will be possible to provide a more 
objective and authentic analysis of his understanding of revelation as ultimate 
concern. A value of this model is its emphasis on the value of revelation for 
the human person. It has a difficult time, however, reflecting on revelation 
for other times and places and is often charged with relativity. I 1 
These five models characterize ways revelation has been thought about 
and understood. With regard to Tillich this analysis is important in 
identifying his understanding of revelation as a mediation of the divine by 
means of experience through aspects of reality represented by Dulles' fifth 
model of revelation. Within the development of Tillich's analysis of revelation 
as new awareness we will need to explain in greater detail how Tillich views 
doctrine as a medium of revelation rather than as revelation itself (what 
Tillich will call the demonic). We will need to focus on how Tillich 
understands the interrelation between history and revelation (we shall see 
that an identification of history with revelation is not possible for Tillich 
' because of the distinction between the transcending character of being which 
' · , cannot directly participate in the subject-object structure of finitude). We will 
· need to focus on the possibiltiy of Tillich's understanding of revelation as an 
; , immediate experience (revelation, for Tillich is humanity's ultimate concern 
' · ·: which is mediated by experience rather than identical with it). And finally, 
we will need to explain how Tillich's conception of revelation relates to a 
dialectical understanding (we will see that there is a close identification of this 
view with Tillich's in the sense that he stresses that we are grasped by 
revelation rather than grasping it). 
With regard to Pannenberg, this analysis of Dulles' models of revelation 
11 Ibid., P. 123. 
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is important by identifying his understanding of revelation as an element of 
universal history represented by the second model. Within the analysis of 
Pannenberg's understanding of revelation, we will need to focus on the way 
he views the function of doctrine (we will see that doctrine functions as a 
record of revelation rather than revelation itself). We will need to focus on 
the role of experience in Pannenberg's view of universal history (for 
Pannenberg, revelation is an external experience of universal history rather 
than an internal personal feeling). We will need to examine how his view of 
revelation accounts for the dialectical presense of God (for Pannenberg, God is 
experienced within the whole of history by means of natural reason). Finally, 
we will need to see how Pannenberg's view of revelation takes into account 
the understanding of revelation as a new awareness (we will see that for 
Panneneberg God is not revealed through experience, but is the experience of 
universal history). By focusing on these aspects of revelation developed by 
Dulles, we will be able to bring a more expansive variety of questions to our 
·discussion of ultimate concern and universal history as aspects of revelation 
· , in the thought of Tillich and Pannenberg which should allow for a more 
: adequate analysis of their positions. Before providing some depth and detail to 
·' 
some of these aspects, I will attempt to establish some historical perspective. 
Historical Suryey 
John Baillie notes, in his book The Idea of Revelation in Recent 
Thought, that for the greater part of Christian history revelation was 
understood as either the knowledge of God discerned by reflection upon nature 
by actions of the human intellect, or the direct self-disclosure of God. He says, 
11 
"This way of defining revelation as communicating a body of knowledge, some 
part at least of which could be independently obtained, or at least verified, by 
'the light of reason and nature,' while the remainder was supplemental to 
what could be so obtained or verified, was long to remain unchallenged." 1 2 
Baillie suggests that after the end of the middle ages, there were two 
significant shifts in the emphasis of these categories of revelation. The 
rationalists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries relied more and more 
on reason as a source of truth and less and less on divine self-disclosure. Those 
holding extreme positions maintained that it was by reason alone that we could 
grasp revelation. We see here the foundation of Dulles' first model 
characterizing revelation as doctrine. By maintaining that revelation could 
unerringly be grasped by reason, it was possible to establish an authoritarian 
"doctrine" of revelation. Spinoza demonstrated somewhat more of a middle 
position. Although he accepts reason as the primary authority of truth, 
Spinoza acknowledges that revelation is involved with obedience and piety. 
'Baillie notes that a significant function of revelation for Spinoza is its 
, . , assurance that the common man as well as the philosopher could achieve 
, blessedness. I 3 
The other significant shift in emphasis was brought about by the early 
leaders of the Protestant reformation. They maintained that human reason 
was so corrupt that it was not able to grasp revelation. Consequently, there 
was a corresponding shift from understanding revelation to be present in 
reason and natural theology to an almost exclusive reliance on scripture 
12John Baillie, The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought (New York: Columbia, 1956), pp. 
5 ff. 
13/bid., p. 7. 
12 
alone. We see here the underlying factors contributing to the development of 
Dulles' fourth model of revelation understood as dialectical presence. For the 
proponents of this model, human reason is too corrupt to grasp adequately the 
revelation of God. This model maintains that, on the one hand, God cannot be 
known, but on the other, in faith, God can choose to be revealed. This explains 
the characteristic "yes and no" element of this postion. 
Toward the end of the eighteenth century rationalist theology was faced 
with the challenge of the developing Romantic movement. Rationalist 
thinkers like Immanuel Kant set out to contain revelation within reason 
altogether. This, according to Kant, was necessary in order to distinguish it 
from faith which should not be associated with reason at alt.14 Thus 
revelation was abolished from natural as well as rational theology. This 
understanding comes close to Dulles' fifth model of revelation as new 
awareness. Proponents of this theory do not wish to identify revelation with 
experience at all but rather as a participation in the divine which is mediated 
: through experience. 
·' Well immersed in the stream of German romanticism with pietistic 
: . undercurrents, Schleiermacher struggled to take a path that steered between 
· the traditional dichotomy of reason and revelation. 
' /. 
For Schleiermacher, the 
, . ~ ... 
source of religion was not the authoritative truths nor the result of cognitive 
activity, rather the source of religion was the feeling of dependence on God. 
Here we see traces of Dulles' third model of revelation understood as an 
individual, personal experience. Attempting to avoid the problems associated 
with understanding revelation identified either with reason or within nature, 
Schleiermacher choose to identify it with the internal experience of feeling. 
14/bid., p. 10. 
13 
Likewise, Ritschl followed a path that did not identify revelation with either of 
the elements of the traditional dichotomy. For Ritschl, revelation is identified 
with the value judgements of faith.15 Thus, toward the end of the nineteenth 
century there was great diversity in the meaning and function of revelation. 
This diversity accounts for the wide variety of conceptions of revelation 
outlined within Dulles' five models of revelation. 
Prominent Twentieth Centuzy Approaches 
More recently, there has been much emphasis on the element of history 
within theological discussion. Because of this, H. Richard Niebuhr believes 
there has been a re-evaluation of the meaning of revelation in the twentieth 
century. It is within his analysis of revelation that we find the historical 
placement of revelation as history. Thus, Niebuhr continues the historical 
discussion of revelation that was begun by Baillie and allows us to place Dulles' 
:remaining model in its historical perspective. 
:' H. Richard Niebuhr 
In his book, The Meaning of Revelation, H. Richard Niebuhr notes the 
conflicts that were involved throughout the Christian Church apart from 
. Baillie's emphasis in the development of revelation particularly in continental 
Protestantism. Niebuhr notes that what was at stake in the debates about 
miracles, prophecy, and between reason and revelation by the deists and 
supematuralists in the eighteenth century, was the traditional right of the 
15/bid., p. 14. 
14 
Church to exercise its authority over society.16 Reason, on the other hand, 
was taken up by the rebellious, democratic, mercantile civilization. As a result 
of the conflict, both the understanding of reason as well as revelation were 
badly damaged. The supernaturalists, stressing the divine authority of the 
Church, viewed the rationalists with scepticism as unfaithful to the tradition. 
The rationalists viewed the supernaturalists as naive and close minded for not 
taking into account much of the developments of the enlightenment. The 
period was characterized with much scepticism and misunderstanding. 
The obvious question that Niebuhr asks is why has the twentieth 
century seen such an interest in revelation when the very thought of the 
term brings to mind these unfonunate conflicts of the past? The answer, for 
Niebuhr, has to do with the development of the idea of spatial and temporal 
relativity which he believes has profoundly affected twentieth century 
thought.17 Developing from this idea, a wider manifestation of its principles 
has also significantly affected historical and social relativity. Today, western 
: culture generally recognizes that reason is limited by the field of experience 
/,and also by its historical and social character. For us, there is no escaping 
: historical and social relativity. Niebuhr suggests that the modem tum back 
to the emphasis on revelation is not to re-hash the traditional conflicts, but . ,:.. 
, 
'i ~ rather to re-evaluate and reflect on religion in light of contemporary 
experience; panicularly, the discovery that one's point of view has a profound 
. influence on the understanding of religious as well as any other aspect of 
reality .18 This development was the spark which ignited the emphasis on the 
16tt.Richard Niebuhr, The Meaning of Revelation (Macmillan, 1960), p. 1. 
11 /bid., p. 5. 
18 fbid. 
15 
close interrelation between revelation and history. Out of it. the various 
elements of Dulles' second model, including Pannenberg's understanding of 
universal history, developed. 
For Niebuhr, God is the being upon whom we are dependent for our 
worth and existence. His claim, however, differs from that of Schleiennacher's 
in that his emphasis is on God rather than the experience of the subject. In 
fact, Niebuhr criticizes both Schleiermacher and Ritschl for putting the 
emphasis on the subject rather than God. Their positions, he maintains, are 
certainly an improvement over the rationalists focus on the object; however, 
they still fail to recognize the true source of revelation. 
Emphasizing that it is God and not the object or subject whom we are 
dependent upon, the question arises, "How can we come to know and 
understand this God?" Niebuhr insists that any experience of the numinous 
must be interpreted experience. "Religious experience and moral sense are to 
be found in may different settings and can be interpreted from many 
:different points of view."19 However, in stressing that revelation is history, 
(which has already been recognized as relative, there is an apparent paradox: 
: Revelation cannot mean history, which is relative, and God!! The gap between 
. the two is conveyed by Lessing's well known "ugly, broad ditch." If revelation 
'.:'is history then people today commit the same error as the Rationalists and 
Romantics by putting their trust and faith in the here and now and not in God. 
At the same time however, Niebuhr maintains that faith is not possible apart 
from history which is the medium in which we live. Niebuhr attempts to solve 
the classical faith/history problem by providing a more detailed examination 
of the nature of history. 
19/bid., p. 39. 
16 
For Niebuhr, there is an important distinction between the impersonal 
objects of ideas, interests, and movements in "external history" and the 
personal subjects of selves in community within "internal history." 
According to him, revelation can never be located in external history but 
must, as it has in the past, be located in the internal history of one's 
community.20 He suggests that this position is supported by traditional 
emphasis in the past on revelation in subjective events-- events in the lives of 
the subjects within a community. The events of this internal history cannot 
be objectively observed, rather "the history of the inner life can only be 
confessed by selves who speak of what happened to them in the community of 
other selves ... 21 Within this understanding of the internal history of a 
community lies the key that Niebuhr uses to unlock the door that separates 
history and faith. He says: 
An inner history, life's flow as regarded from the point of view of living selves, is 
always an affair of faith. As long as a man lives he must believe in something for 
the sake of which he lives; without belief in something that makes life worth living 
man cannot exist. . . Such faith in gods or in values for which men live is 
inseparable from internal history. 2 2 
Thus, Niebuhr understands faith as the recognition of meaning and unity in 
; }he personal lives of members within a community. Faith is intrinsically 
' 
, , : involved in the workings of inner history. 
By discussing internal and external history separately, Niebuhr does 
not wish to suggest an extreme dualism exists between them; rather, he 
emphasizes that the external happenings of history are directly contributory 
20/bid., p. 53. 
211 bid., p. 54. 
22/bid., pp. 56-57. 
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to the events of internal history. It is the elements of external history which 
form the foundation and structure of the world in which we live, 
communicate, and function. External history has "reminded the church of the 
earthen nature of the vessel in which the treasure of faith existed. "2 3 
According to Niebuhr, God is not only the being which is revealed through the 
internal history of a community, but also the creator of all things. As a result 
of this, it is also necessary to attempt to look beyond the limited confines of 
one's particular internal history into the more universal existence of all 
things and · all events. Internal and external history are integrally related in 
that the very existence of internal history is dependent upon external history 
which provides its embodiment. " 'Words without thought never to heaven go' 
but thoughts without words never remain on earth."24 
For Niebuhr, there is also an integral relationship between revelation 
and reason. It is reason, with the continuing conversation between sensation 
and imagination, that allows us to understand and communicate revelation 
'within the internal structure of our history . On the other hand, it is 
. · 1evelation itself, discovered within internal history, that guides the process of 
reason. "Without revelation reason is limited and guided into error; without 
·reason revelation illuminates only itself. n25 This circular understanding of . /. 
';:'revelation is summarized by Niebuhr: 
Revelation means the moment in our history through which we know ourselves to be 
known from beginning to end, in which we are apprehended by the knower; it 
means the self-disclosing of that eternal knower. Revelation means the moment in 
which we are surprised by the knowledge of someone there in the darkness and the 
void of human life; it means the self-disclosure of light in our darkness. 
23fbid., p. 63. 
24fbid., pp. 65-66. 
25fbid., p. 89. 
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Revelation is the moment in which we find our judging selves to be judged not by 
ourselves or our neighbors but by one who knows the final secrets of the heart; 
revelation means the self-disclosure of the judge. Revelation means that we find 
ourselves to be valued rather than valuing and that all our values are transvaluated 
by the activity of a universal valuer. 2 6 
This understanding of revelation itself taking the active role and the 
individual taking the passive role is taken up by John Macquarrie's focus on 
the Heideggerian modes of conceptual knowledge. Before turning to 
Macquarrie, who gives existential and ontological depth to Niebuhr's 
conception of history, it will be helpful if we take a moment to highlight the 
significant issues that Niebuhr raises in his analysis of revelation. 
Clearly the central issue of revelation for Niebuhr is history. He takes a 
great deal of time to point out the complex nature of history and its 
relationship to revelation. For him, history is made up of both objective, non-
personal, external elements which embody the subjective, personal, internal 
aspects. It is within the internal history of a community that one recognizes 
and is recognized by faith as having meaning and unity. Finally, Niebuhr 
.stresses the importance of reason which is necessary for understanding and 
, 1 .communicating revelation, but also being dependent, along with action, upon 
, .. revelation for guidance and direction. Niebuhr, as well as Pannenberg, 
; paving been influenced by the historical/critical movement of this century, 
' 
': : have similar views of history. Both Niebuhr and Pannenberg view history as 
a unity. Niebuhr stresses the integration of the internal and external 
elements of history for the recognition of its unity; Pannenberg stresses the 
universal observation of history as a whole for the recognition of its unity. 
For Tillich, history is comprized of an immanent and a transcendent element. 
26ibid., pp. 111-112 
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The immanent is life within the temporal limits of time and space. The 
transcendent is being-itself which can be mediated through all of reality. As 
we shall see, Tillich stresses that both elements are necessary in order to 
interpret and understand historical events. 
John Macquarrie 
Whereas Niebuhr focuses on the historical aspects of revelation, 
Macquarrie is concerned with the ontological foundation underlying the 
historical process. He recognizes that the historical experience of a 
community is the source of any recognition of revelation, however, he 
maintains that this understanding of revelation is mediated through the 
relatively objective aspects of scripture and tradition which the community 
has founded.27 Macquarrie stresses that in order for this to occur, it is first 
necessary for one to be existentially aware of the mood of anxiety. This mood, 
'which can be understood as a certain "mode of awareness" is the result of 
r ,realization of the polarities and tensions in human life. Thus, faced with 
;' possibility and responsibility, on the one hand, and finitude and death on the 
· . Other, anxiety and concern about existence develop. Macquarrie says: 
This mood may be said to constitute our capacity for rece1vmg revelation. It 
predisposes us to recognize the approach of holy being. In other words, I am 
asserting a continuity between the quest for sense and grace that arises out of 
man's existence, and the directionally opposite quest for man to which 
experiences of grace and revelation bear witness, a quest that is initiated outside 
of man and remains beyond his control.2 8 
27John Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1977), p. 9. 
28/bid., p. 87. 
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As a result of this mood of anxiety we experience being. 
Most of the time we are only aware of particular things: color. sound. 
shape. etc. However, as a result of the mood of anxiety. we become aware of 
being. which is no particular thing but the condition for any-thing to be at 
all. "Being is all the time around us, but for the most part it does not get 
explicitly noticed. 11 29 It is not possible to conceptualize being because it does 
not participate in the subject/object interchange of our temporal spatial 
reality. Rather being is experienced more as a presence and manifestation. 
Thus one who experiences revelation is aware of the same things as one who 
does not, but in a different way.30 The difference lies in the recognition of 
the universal being in and through all particular things. Macquarrie states 
that this understanding of being as revelation is similar to Rudolf Otto's 
conception of mysterium tremendum fascinans (the mystery that is at once 
overwhelming and fascinating) in his well know book The Idea of the Holy. 
The mysterium refers to the incomprehensible depth of the holy, the 
'tremendum emphasizes the otherness and transcendence of the holy, and the 
, · fascinans represents the unveiling of the grace of the holy as the source and 
: strength of our being. 3 I 
In attempting to locate this experience of revelation in our cognitive 
activity, Macquarrie relies heavily on Martin Heidegger's understanding of 
levels or modes of thinking. There are generally three modes of cognitive 
experience. The first mode is concerned with the objective observation of 
external things. Heidegger refers to this mode as calculative thinking. The 
29/bid. 
30/bid .• p. 89. 
3 l Jbid .. pp. 87-88. 
21 
ideal goal is to become a pure spectator of objective happenings. In a sense, 
we subject the external objects of our world to our rational objectification by 
attempting to master their essence and reality. The human is the active 
subject, the thing is the passive object. 
The second level of thinking is the existential mode. In this mode, one 
does not take what is thought about as an object, but rather recognizes what is 
thought about as another subject having the same kind of being as the one 
doing the thinking.32 Whereas in the previous mode fear is understood as the 
physiological changes in heart rate, respiration, etc.; here fear would be 
understood as the "existent's own first-hand participation in the experience of 
fear, and, prior to that, on his participation in a finite existence for which 
fear is a possibility."33 The human is the active subject engaged with other 
active subjects. There is activity on both sides grounded in mutuality and 
reciprocity. 
The third and final category of thinking is the primordial/essential 
mode. The primary characteristic of this mode is much more meditative than 
1. ,calculative. It is thinking which answers to the demand of being. In 
·' 
describing this mode of thought, Macquarrie says: 
What would seem to happen both in the primordial thinking of the philosopher and 
in the revelatory experience of the religious man (if indeed these two can be 
definitely distinguished) is that the initiative passes to that which is known, so 
that we are seized by it and it impresses itself upon us. But what is known is not 
another being, but rather being itself, the being which communicates itself 
through all the particular beings by which it is present, by which it manifests 
itself, and not least through the depth of our own being, for we too are participants 
in being and indeed the only participants to which being opens itself, so that we 
not only are but we exist.3 4 
32/bid., p. 92. 
33/bid. 
34/bid., p. 94. 
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Macquarrie identifies his ontological understanding of revelation within this 
mode of cognitive experience. For him, the reality of being resembles gift-
like knowledge. Whereas in the first mode of cognitive experience we are 
active subjects directing our observations upon passive objects, and the second 
mode in which we are mutually active subjects, within this third mode the 
category of being, for the most part, is the active subject which directs the 
awareness of its manifestation upon us, who, have become the objects of its 
revelation. Although there is certainly an element of passivity in our 
disposition with regard to this final mode of thinking, Macquarrie points out 
that we are not fully passive. He suggests that there is an element of 
appropriation in which being "reveals itself not only in otherness but also in 
kinship, so that even as we are grasped by it, we can to some extent grasp it in 
turn and hold to it. n3 5 
In summary, Macquarrie acknowledges the notion of the historical 
mediation of revelation but directs his focus on the existential, ontological 
:'interrelation between cognitive experience and revelation. For Macquarrie, 
this understanding of revelation demands involvement, participation and 
concern. Macquarrie's understanding of revelation as concern strongly 
:,1'esembles Tillich's notion of ultimate concern. Both have been influenced by 
" , Heidegger's ontological theory and share the understanding of revelation as 
being-itself which can become our ultimate concern. On the other hand, 
Pannenberg is much less concerned with ontology and much more concerned 
with history. As we shall see in our analysis of Pannenberg, revelation is not 
· a sense of concern stemming from the presence of being in reality, but rather 
35/bid., p. 95. 
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a universal conception of history as a unified whole. For Pannenberg, all of 
reality is revelation. But in order to accurately recognize it, one must be able 
to place it within the universal schema of history as a whole. 
By providing some depth to the ontological elements of revelation 
which were preliminarily exposed within Dulles' fifth model of revelation as 
new awareness, we will be able to approach the thought of Tillich and 
Pannenberg more objectively. In the following analysis of Tillich, we will 
need to focus on how the ontological categories outlined here by Macquarrie 
relate to the historical elements stressed by Niebuhr. In our analysis of 
Pannenberg we will need to see how he is able to focus on history with little 
regard to ontology. 
Gordon D. Kaufman 
Whereas Niebuhr provided the emphasis and detail on the historical 
·aspects of revelation and Macquarrie focused upon some of the existential and 
/,ontological elements, Gordon D. Kaufman, in his book Systematic Theology: A 
, , Historicist Perspective, sets out to emphasize that the correlation of both 
. historical mediation as well as ontological depth is necessary in order to 
·/understand revelation adequately. He does not provide the historical depth of 
Niebuhr nor the existential depth of Macquarrie, but rather provides breadth 
that manages to tie together a variety of some of the significant elements and 
interrelations involved in understanding revelation. Like Niebuhr, Kaufman 
recognizes that all knowledge is relative to the historical situation of the 
knower.36 He also maintains that "the ontological foundations of our deepest 
36oordon D. Kaufman, Systematic Theology: A Historicist Perspective (New York: Charles 
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convictions are in history ... 3 7 He believes these ontological foundations are 
the sources of meaningfulness that are grounded in individual historical 
events or processes. Kaufman stresses that there are various shades of 
meaning present within history. This meaning relates to either a moment of 
conversion or formation of self-structure or the events within a tradition that 
have central significance for a tradition. Thus there are two levels of 
revelatory experience: the personal-individual and the cultural-historical. 
These are existentially correlated in such a way that a given tradition has 
ultimate meaning for a person or gives meaning to history. 
Kaufman distinguishes between scientific and historical knowledge by 
focusing on their epistemological foundations. Whereas science attempts 
abstract "inferences" and "imaginative leaps" to form meaningful unities of 
"great varieties of observations drawn from widely separated tracts of 
experience," events in history "can be known in their particularity and detail 
only through evidences given by eyewitnesses and inferences based on these 
·evidences. "38 Thus it is the conviction of Kaufman that God is present and 
1',working in the words and deeds of people in history. He maintains that there 
are three roots of our knowledge of the Christian faith in historical events. 
· · . The Bible holds the collection of primary witnesses of the original events. The 
'::'history and tradition of the church form the collection of secondary sources 
and interpretations of the events within the Bible. And finally, the 
apprehension and conviction of truth within doctrine forms the third source 
of knowledge. Along with these historical events, Kaufman suggests that a 
Scribner's Sons, 1968), p. 14. 
31 Jbid., p. 25. 
38/bid., pp. 42-43. 
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second norm guiding our theological work must be our contemporary 
experience. He says, "It is with reference to the historical norm that we can 
adjudge whether a given position or claim is 'Christian;' it is with reference to 
the experiential norm that we adjudge whether it 'makes sense.'3 9 In a 
footnote Kaufman explains that the interrelation between these two elements 
is much more complicated than he suggests. In it, he gives some dimension to 
several of the more complex historical and existential elements that are at 
work (i.e. the dependence of the historical dimension on criteria of method, 
conception of truth, etc. He also notes that historically created categories have 
considerable influence on one's existential view). 40 Kaufman is not as 
concerned with the complex details of the interrelation, rather, he stresses 
that one should recognize that these two elements exist and are distinct and 
important aspects involved in understanding revelation. 
Thus, Kaufman's stress on the correlation between the existential as 
well as historical elements in understanding revelation shows the 
. interrelation of Dulles' second model of revelation as history and fifth model of 
, ,revelation as new awareness. This analysis will allow us to ask questions of 
, · Tillich and Pannenberg relating to this corelative understanding of 
· revelation. As far as emphasizing the significance of history as well as 
' ·:: experience in attempting to grasp revelation, Kaufman resembles Tillich. 
Whereas Kaufman maintains that historical events can directly convey 
meaning and revelation; Tillich stresses that history only functions as an 
indirect medium through which revelation is understood as ultimate concern. 
Pannenberg is not as interested in a correlation between experience and 
39/bid., p. 76. 
40 Ibid., p. 78. 
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history. He is convinced that history is one with experience. It alone is the 
essential element necessary to experience revelation. Kaufman's stress on the 
necessity of encorporating both elements in one's understanding of revelation 
is something we shall keep in mind in analyizing the thought of both Tillich 
and Pannenberg. With regard to Tillich, we will need to focus on how this 
interrelation takes place. With Pannenberg, we will need to understand why 
there is no necessity for the ontological, existential element. 
Michael L. Cook 
Adding some depth and detail to this complex relationship between the 
texts of history and contemporary experience is Michael L. Cook, S.J. By 
stressing the necessity of using a metaphoric process in order to grasp 
revelation, Cook provides some detail to the use of symbol outlined by Dulles' 
fifth model of revelation as new awareness . Whereas the previous analysis 
. :provided detail to the function of history and ontology in revelation, Cook 
1 ,demonstrates some of the cognitive, hermeneutical elements involved in 
, . attempting to interpret and understand revelation. In his article "Revelation 
· as Metaphoric Process, 11 41 Cook turns to revelation, which he views as the . ,:. 
' 
·;: foundation of all Christian theologizing, in an attempt to answer the "crucial 
but unanswered question of contemporary theology:" What is the relationship 
between the universal salvific will of God and the absolute uniqueness of 
Jesus? Cook attempts to answer the question by relying on what he 
understands to be a more unitive and universal ground for resolving such 
4 1 Michael L. Cook, S.J., "Revelation as Metaphoric Process" Theological Studies 41 (Sept. 
1986). 
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questions in the primary language of symbol. metaphor. and story.42 In his 
article he lays out a metaphoric process by which he attempts to intertwine 
the specifically Christian with the more universally human. In comparing 
his metaphoric process with Dulles' Models of Revelation, Cook explains that 
all models are metaphoric in the sense that they possess comprehensive. 
organizational potential. Cook stresses that root metaphors (i.e. those 
metaphors which express the most basic assumptions about reality). which he 
uses. are more fundamental and pervasive and thus subordinate all other 
models of revelation.43 Cook provides excellent insight into the essence of 
revelation and the necessity of using metaphoric language in attempting to 
understand the complex interrelationships involved. He says: 
The question of revelation is finally a question of truth. In terms of the models, it 
is a question of the interrelationship of propositional truth. historical truth, 
personal truth (in the sense of direct experience, whether immediate or mediated), 
transcendent truth, and immanent truth. Such an interrelationship depends upon 
how one understands symbol as related to the language of metaphor and story 
(particularly myth and parable), on the one hand, and more conceptual forms such 
as simile, allegory, and analogy, on the other. I suggest that an analysis of these 
relationships will affirm the primacy of story in the revelatory process, a primacy 
that reflects the narrative quality of all human experience.4 4 
, . According to Cook, symbol has the power to invoke mystery because it is able 
· to address itself to the whole person: the imagination, will, emotions, and 
• ,t. 
' , · : intellect. It is deeply rooted in human experience and history and emerges 
from the depth of human consciousness both individual and collective. "This 
symbolic rootedness in life (bios ) must come to expression, the level of 
articulation (logos ), as metaphor ... 45 
.42/bid .. pp. 388-389. 
43/bid., p. 389. 
44Jbid., pp. 390-391. 
45/bid .. p. 392. 
Symbol and metaphor are integrally 
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related: symbols need metaphors for expression and meaning, metaphors need 
symbols in order to be rooted in life. Cook refers to Paul Ricoeur's 
Interpretation Theory in explaining the relationship between symbol and 
metaphor. Ricoeur says: 
Everything indicates that symbolic experience calls for a work of meaning from 
metaphor, a work which it partially provides through its organizational network 
and its hierarchical levels. Everything indicates that symbol systems constitute a 
reservoir of meaning whose metaphoric potential is yet to be spoken.4 6 
The value of metaphor is in its ability to place two active thoughts in tension 
with one another which leads to mutual interaction between them. Cook 
stresses that a metaphor is represented by A=B.47 A Yiddish saying will serve 
as an example: "To a worm in horseradish the whole world is horseradish." 
This tensive interaction between the elements of a metaphor can result in new 
possibilities. Metaphor cannot be literalized or it will die. Also, it requires 
panicipation in its referent (i.e. using the above example, one must, to some 
,degree, know what a worm and horseradish are in order to become aware of 
; 'the metaphoric possibilities). "In the final analysis, one cannot understand a 
' t ; 
" metaphor unless one knows the story (or game) that gives the metaphor its 
.. ·context. n48 This necessity to refer to stories is related to the nature of human 
. ' . :'experience. Relying on Gerhan and Russell's Metaphoric Process, and their 
i .' 
·employment of Bernard Lonergan's distinction. Cook stresses that human 
experience is always interpreted and either immediate (knowledge of objects 
·as bodies in their relations to self) or mediate (knowledge of objects as things 
46/bid .• p. 392. 
41 fbid., p. 393. 
48/bid. 
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in relation with one another).49 Relying both on Lonergan as well as the 
hermeneutical theory of David Tracy, Cook states that human experience 
"implies the theoretical activity of human minds, both of the human 
community that proceeds and surrounds us and of our own theoretical and 
imaginative capacities. ,,50 Because of the essential "durational" character of 
experience in the continuing dialectic between past, present, and future, the 
best way to talk about it is to tell stories. 
There are a great variety of stories all of which attempt to show us how 
the world works. Cook points out that it is the religious stories characterized 
by the tension of myth (stories that set up worlds) and parables (stories that 
disturb worlds) and actions (stories that explore the world halfway between 
myth and parable) that "give us the opportunity to explore, to rethink, to 
stretch the imagination ... 51 For Cook, symbol, metaphor, and story, although 
distinct, form a unity. Symbolic experience must express itself with metaphor 
if it is to become meaningful and coherent to human consciousness, and 
. ~metaphor must come to narrative expression if it is to come to full contextual 
r ,meaning in human experience.5 2 
In returning to Dulles' models, Cook maintains that revelation on the 
· level of primary language is best understood in the interaction between model . ,:. 
' '.·: four (dialectical presence) and model five (new awareness). Revelation is 
primarily a correlation between word and faith.53 What is important in this 
correlation is the emphasis on divine initiative as well as the involvement of 
49/bid. 
50/bid. 
51 fbid., pp. 394-395. 
52/bid., p. 395. 
53/bid., p. 398 ff. 
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God in human history and experience: "the God who dialogues." The "definitive 
example" according to Cook is the death and resurrection of Jesus. God took the 
initiative of sending his son to express the fullness of his love to humanity. 
The free human response on the part of Jesus was faithful obedience to the 
will of God; on the part of· his contemporaries it was either to accept or deny 
God's offering of love. God's response and initiative in the face of the rejection 
was to raise Jesus from the dead expressing a continual initiative of love 
despite the rejection. Cook says, "The point is twofold, the initiative is always 
God's (this is what it means to call God Creator, Alpha and Omega), but God's 
initiative is always mediated through the free response of His creatures. 
Revelation occurs in this dialectical unity and comes to expression primarily 
as narrated metaphor. 115 4 Cook points out that Dulles recognizes the close 
correspondence between the new awareness model and symbolic 
communication. This model does not view God as an outsider, but rather as one 
working from within in the creative, unitive, dialogic process of divine 
. initiative and human response. 
Cook emphasizes that this metaphoric process is dependent upon the 
primacy of symbol. He discusses the threefold process of Ricoeur's 
. understanding of the function of symbol in the process of interpret a ti on 
• ,! 
' experience. 5 5 ',:between the text of a tradition and contemporary First, there 
must be a precritical and unreflexive experience of symbol in an openness to 
what the text might say to the experience of the interpreter. Second, there 
must be a move from a vague, subjective understanding symbol to a more 
critical, conceptual understanding formed by some method (i.e. biblical 
54/bid •• p. 398. 
55 Jbid., pp. 400-401 
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criticism, historical, literary, etc.). Cook places Dulles' first three models of 
revelation (propositional, historical, experiential) within this second step of 
symbolic interpretation. He notes that these conceptualizations are intrinsic 
to revelation, but are subordinate to revelation. This is the case because a 
conceptualization can never exhaust the possibility of content within a 
mystery. The third and final step is a return back to the symbol. By going 
through this process and experiencing the symbol in a new and distinct way, 
we experience new possibilities. With these new possibilities one must return 
back to the first step. It is a continual process. 
This emphasis on metaphoric process is essential, for Cook, in 
understanding the relationship between the universal will of God and the 
particular revelation in Jesus Christ. By conceptualizing revelation as 
metaphoric process, one can understand the stories, metaphors, and symbols of 
Christ in a way that makes them appropriate for humanity as a whole. By 
focusing on these elements, Cook gives some depth to the interrelation 
. between historical elements, outlined by Niebuhr, and experiential aspects, 
. /;outlined by Macquarrie. By stressing the need to bring together elements of 
, · history and experience, Cook's objectives resemble Kaufman's. They differ 
· . from all our previous analyses in the sense that the focus is on elements of 
a ! 
' · .. :human knowing, interpretating, and understanding revelation. In our 
analysis of Tillich and Pannenberg it will be necessary to identify the 
hermeneutical elements outlined by Cook. In the case of Tillich: how is it that 
one can know, interpret, and understand being-itself both in history as well as 
contemporary experience? For Pannenberg: what exactly allows people to 
accurately know, interpret, and understand universal history? How does 
story, symbol, and metaphor function in their respective understandings of 
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revelation? 
Thus we have come from a broad overview of revelation outlined by 
Dulles' five models of. revelation. given it some historical perspective with the 
analysis of Baillie and Niebuhr, provided some detail and depth to the 
significant elements involved in the interrelation of history and revelation 
with the analysis of Niebuhr, demonstrated the significance of the ontological. 
existential elements in revelation by analyzing Macquarrie. shown the value 
of correlating both the historical as well as the experienctial aspects of 
revelation by focusing on Kaufman, and finally provided a somewhat detailed 
description of the function of metaphoric elements in interpretive theory 
important in understanding revelation in history as well as contemporary 
experience. All of these elements are important factors in attempting to 
analyze and comprehend the extremely complex and diverse concept of 
revelation . 
. ! . 
CHAPTER II 
ULTIMATE CONCERN AS REVELATION IN THE THOUGHT OF PAUL TILLICH 
Before attempting to analyze Tillich's understanding of revelation as 
the manifestation of ultimate concern. it will be helpful if we first clarify 
some of the significant questions which have developed from chapter one 
which we will need to bring to our analysis of Tillich's notion of ultimate 
concern. Stemming from Dulles' analysis of revelation we will need to see how 
Tillich's notion of ultimate concern relates to the understanding of revelation 
as doctrine. as history, as internal experience, as dialectic and as new 
awareness? Arising from Niebuhr's analysis we will need to focus on how 
·.Tillich attempts to deal with the relativity of one's particular historical point 
1 ·of view with regard to theological thought? Also, how is it that Tillich attempts 
' . to deal with the universality of faith and the particularities of history? As a 
' ; .result of Macquarrie's analysis of revelation we will need to focus on how 
' ' . • 
: · revelation is mediated by history through ontological categories? Stemming 
i ,' 
from Kaufman's analysis we will need to examine how ultimate concern 
accounts for the interrelation of historical and ontological elements? Finally, 
arising out of Cook's analysis of the hermeneutical elements of attempting to 
grasp revelation conceptually, we will need to see how Tillich's notion of 
ultimate concern allows one to know or interpret revelation in both history as 
33 
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well as contemporary experience? With these questions in mind we now turn 
to Paul Tillich's understanding of revelation as ultimate concern. 
In this analysis of revelation as ultimate concern in the thought of Paul 
Tillich we will focus, primarily, on his Systematic Theology. It is within this 
system of thought that the foundational character of revelation as ultimate 
concern is described. In this section I hope to provide an accurate description 
of Tillich's understanding of ultimate concern by focusing on the elements of 
its ontological structure as well as its interrelations with other elements of his 
systematic thought which reveal significant aspects of the meaning and 
function of ultimate concern as an element of revelation. Before attempting to 
do this, it may be helpful if we outline some of the preliminary objectives, 
presumptions and criteria that function in the thought of Tillich. This 
introduction will help us to understand the underlying disposition of Tillich's 
thought necessary to grasp the overall direction of his systematic analysis of 
Theology. 
Underlying the whole of Tillich's Systematic Theology, is his conviction 
. ,',that theology functions between what he calls the "eternal truth" and the 
, · "temporal situation" in which this truth is received. Thus, Tillich continually 
; . strives to address the questions implied within humanity's dynamic situation 
·.:'with the answers found by maintaining contact with the essence and identity 
of the kergyma within tradition which comes from beyond and is mediated 
through experience. This apologetic or "answering theology,"56 deals with 
the interrelation and correlation of questions and answers and provides the 
structure of Tillich's simplest ideas as well as the tremendously complex 
56Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1951), p. 
6. 
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constructions of entire sections of his work. 
On the one hand, the method of correlation must focus on 
humanity's existential situation. The situation, for Tillich, is not concerned 
with the particular state of individual as individual or group as group but 
rather with the forms of creative cultural interpretations of these states (i.e. 
scientific, artistic, political. etc.). For example. Tillich explains that theology 
would not be concerned with mental illness itself but rather with the 
psychological interpretation of the illness. 51 Implied within these cultural 
interpretations are the multitude of questions of humanity's existential 
situation. 
On the other hand, the method of correlation must focus on what Tillich 
calls the "eternal truth." The source of this answer side is outlined in his two 
formal criteria of theology. The first is that the objects 8 of theology is 
ultimate concern.59 It is a concern that is ultimate, unconditional, and 
infinite. This ultimate concern can be manifest in every preliminary concern 
which becomes an object insofar as it points to ultimate concern (e.g. pictures, 
, poems, music, etc.). What is significant about this first formal criterion is the 
, '.emphasis on the infinite nature of ultimate concern. It can never be 
; ·anything in particular, but particular things can point to it. The second 
ti l· 
':'formal criterion establishes the ontological structure of ultimate concern. In 
: it, Tillich describes ultimate concern as "that which determines our being or 
511bid .• pp. 3-4. 
58The term "object" in this context should be understood as that to which theology directs 
itself, not to be confused with a finite "object" existing within the temporal limits of time 
and space. This ontological character of ultimate concern will be developed in much 
greater detail further in the section. 
59 Ibid., p. 12. 
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not-being." 6 O Anything that is of ultimate concern for us must have 
influence on our being. This understanding of "being" is not to be confused 
with temporal existence. Rather, it is that which includes the whole of human 
reality-- its structure, meaning, and aim of existence. I will attempt to 
demonstrate that it is Tillich's understanding of ultimate concern understood 
as revelation which becomes the foundation of the answering side of his 
method of correlation underlying the whole of his theological thought. 
These are some of the primary objectives and criteria that are at work 
in Tillich's thought. In what follows, I will attempt to analyze the meaning 
and role of ultimate concern in the theological thought of Tillich. I will 
generally follow the structure of the five main sections of his Systematic 
Theology dealing first with the questions implied in the situation and secondly 
with the way ultimate concern functions as the answer. In several cases I 
have relied on other works of Tillich in order to clarify or add substance to 
specific elements of my analysis. 
' , Ultimate Concern and Reason 
Within this first section of his system, Tillich attempts to correlate the 
'.-:-" .. 
;''.questions implied in existence dealing with humanity's finitude, self-
estrangement, and the ambiguities of reason with the answers derived from 
our ultimate concerns. He begins by pointing out that the classical 
philosophical tradition understood reason as the structure of the mind that 
allows one to grasp and transform all aspects of reality (cognitive, aesthetic, 
60/bid., p. 14. 
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practical, and technical). According to Tillich, all that remains of this diverse 
understanding of reason in the popular mind is the technical aspect which is 
concerned with cognitive activity alone.6 1 
Tillich makes a distinction between what he considers controlling 
knowledge and receiving knowledge.62 In controlling knowledge, technical 
reason unites subject and object so that the subject can gain control over the 
object (detachment). Because of this detachment, the substance of controlling 
knowledge is fairly secure and objective. With receiving knowledge, the 
subject attempts to take the object into itself (union). This union of subject 
and object involves the element of emotional participation whereas 
controlling knowledge attempts to separate itself as much as possible. As a 
result of the focus on union, receiving knowledge involves understanding 
which stems from participation and gives it the potential for becoming 
ultimately significant. 6 3 The problem, however, is that controlling 
knowledge, although it possesses objective certainty, lacks the potential for 
becoming ultimately significant because it lacks the necessary element of 
, 'participation. On the other hand, receiving knowledge, although possessing 
, '.the element of participation, and consequently, the potential for being 
· . ultimately significant, lacks the certitude that stems from the objective . ~ 
·.;'detachment of controlling knowledge. For Tillich, any attempt to understand a 
61systematic., p. 73. 
621t is interesting to note the similarity between these two categories of reason with 
Heidegger's understanding of the calculative and existential modes of cognitive 
experience. 
63By "ultimately significant" Tillich means that intimate participation within the object 
is a necessary step in allowing the element of being-itself to influence our being. Thus, 
receiving knowledge can become our ultimate concern. As we shall see, Tillich maintains 
that the fulfillment of complete union is only possible as a result of revelation. See 
Systematic, vol. I, pp. 98-100. 
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person, historical event, text, etc. must involve an amalgamation of 
controlling and receiving knowledge (a paradoxical coming together of 
detachment and union). 64 The solution of this paradox of reason is found in 
the ontological structure of revelation as our ultimate concern. Only 
revelation can allow the elements of reason to become certain as well as 
ultimately meaningful. 6 5 
Thus, reason is only meaningful as an expression of ontological 
reason. 66 Ontological reason is concerned with the universal structure of 
being, and consequently, the depth of being. 6 7 It is not reason itself but 
rather precedes it and is manifest through it. Ontological reason in the 
cognitive realm is concerned with truth itself; in the aesthetic realm, beauty 
itself; and in the legal realm, with justice itself. It is a mystery in the sense 
that it precedes the subject/object structure of reality. In this sense, 
ontological reason is understood as revelation. "The word 'revelation' 
('removing the veil') has been used traditionally to mean the manifestation of 
~omething hidden which cannot be approached through ordinary ways of 
1 gaining knowledge. 11 6 8 Because knowledge is dependent upon the 
, ·,subject/object structure of reality, revelation is an experience which cannot 
; ·be dissolved into it. 69 Thus, even in its manifestation, revelation still remains . ,:. 
, : ' 
· ' 64s . l I 98 , .· ystematzc., vo. , p. . 
. 65/bid., p. 105. 
66This is Tillich's equivalent to Heidegger's ontological mode of thought. Macquarrie 
describes it as thinking which answers to the demand of being. 
67 In discussing the ontological element of reason, Tillich necessarily uses metaphoric 
language (i.e. being itself, depth, ground, abyss, etc.). The significance of using symbols 
and metaphors in discussing revelation as ultimate concern will be explained later in 
much greater detail. For now, it is important to recognize that revelatory language is 
metaphoric in nature and not to be confused with a literal understanding. 
68systematic., vol. I, p. 108. 
69/bid., pp. 108ff. 
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a mystery. In a negative sense, mystery is experienced as an abysmal element, 
as the threat of non-being. In the positive sense, it appears as that which 
conquers the threat of non-being, it appears as ultimate concern. It is this 
sense of mystery which becomes the first step to experiencing ultimate 
concern. Only when reason is driven beyond itself out of the subject/object 
structure of reality to the realization of being and non-being can one 
experience the mystery of ultimate concern. 
Revelation is that which concerns us ultimately. It is an ultimate 
concern for us because it concerns the very ground of our being. If 
Revelation exists only as an ultimate concern for a particular individual or 
group, then there is no general revelation. For Tillich, there is no revelation 
if there is no one to receive it as an ultimate concern.70 Thus, revelation 
always involves the union of a subjective and objective side: subjectively, 
someone is grasped by ultimate concern; objectively, there is that which 
grasps someone. There is no experience of an ultimate concern without being 
'in the state of ecstasy-- literally, "standing outside oneself." 
. 1 • The state of ecstasy does not negate reason but is the state of mind in 
, · which reason is outside the subject/object structure of reality. "Ecstasy unites 
·the experience of the abyss to which reason in all its functions is driven with 
• l· 
' ':;the experience of the ground in which reason is grasped by the mystery of its 
own depth and of the depth of being generally ... 71 Ecstasy is the form in 
which ultimate concern manifests itself within humanity's psychological 
condition. It is important to note that it manifests itself through them and is 
not created by them. The ecstatic experience of the ground of being in events, 
10Jbid., pp. llOff. 
11Jbid., p. 113 
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persons, and things becomes humanity's ultimate concern. 
Thus, all reality-- things, people, and events can become the media for 
that which concerns us ultimately. Tillich describes the experience of this 
occurrence as a revelatory constellation.? 2 There is a qualitative difference 
between the significance and truth of the revelation mediated through 
different elements of reality. The criteria for this significance is the ability of 
the particular aspect of reality to point to its ground and meaning. For Tillich, 
the person represents the central qualities of revelation, and by implication, 
all qualities. However, other things can become supporting elements of 
revelation (Tillich uses the example of the power of resisting and enduring in 
a stone which is used in the metaphor of God as "rock of ages"). Tillich stresses 
that all natural things and events (e.g. stars, plants, people, natural 
catastrophes, birth, death, danger, etc.) can become media and bearers of 
revelation. Finally, even language can become a medium of revelation. 
Tillich describes language that enters a revelatory constellation as 
~ransparent language which allows the depth of being and meaning to shine 
I 
> r ihrough. This demonstrates his conviction in the mediatory nature of all 
, '.reality with regard to revelation. Tillich says, "In all these cases it is not the 
·thing . /- or the event as such which has revelatory character; they 
' ':'which uses them as a medium and bearer of revelation ... 7 3 By 
special conditions of a revelatory constellation they can become 
through which revelation is experienced as an ultimate concern. 
12/bid., pp. l 18ff. 
13/bid., p. 119. 
reveal that 
entering the 
the medium 
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Ultimate Concern and Being 
In the previous section we focused on Tillich's understanding of reason 
and its interrelation with revelation as ultimate concern. It, as well as the 
final section on history, are, in a sense, separate from the central part of the 
system. The epistemological as well as the historical elements of theology are 
involved within the whole of the system, but for matters of expediency and 
coherence Tillich treats them separately. Thus section two "Being and God," 
forms the first part of the central structure of his system. In it, Tillich 
analyzes humanity's essential nature (what one ought to be vs. what one is) in 
unity with the essential nature of everything that has being. There is a 
correlation between the questions implied in the ontological structure of 
finitude with God understood as humanity's ultimate concern. 
The ontological question is what is being itself? In his book, Bib Li cal 
Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality, Tillich discusses the Socratic 
"paradox of knowledge" in relation to humanity asking the question of being. 
·;Because we ask the question there is something about being which we do not 
. ' . 
·. possess, otherwise we would not ask the question . Also, there must be 
. .'something of being which we must possess, for, if not, it could not be the 
' .. 
',dbject of a question.74 Thus, we are somewhat of a mixture of being and non-. ' 
.~· being: this is what is meant when we say we are finite. "He who is infinite 
· does not ask the question of being, for, as infinite, he has the complete power 
of being. He is identical with it; he is God."75 In our quest for the "really real" 
or the essential substance and meaning of things and people we find ourselves 
74Paul Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality (The University of 
Chicago Press, 1955), p. 11. 
75 Jbid., pp. 11-12. 
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delving into deeper and deeper levels of reality. In our attempt to discover the 
ultimate reality of a thing we discover that it is no longer a thing along side 
other things, but rather, it participates in the ground of all levels: the power 
and substance of being. This quest for the ultimate meaning in all things is 
the quest for being itself. It is in being itself that everything that is, can 
become an ultimate concern for humanity. All things are "elements of an 
encounter, namely, the encounter with the holy. They are parts of this 
encounter, not as things or values, but as bearers of something beyond 
themselves. 0 76 This something beyond is described as "the holy, the numinous 
presence of that which concerns us ultimately. "7 7 Holiness is the name Tillich 
gives to this quality of that which concerns us ultimately. Ultimate concern is 
an experienced phenomenon which can only become actual in the mediation 
of being itself through things.7 8 
The ontological structure of being as ultimate concern underlies all of 
reality; it is present whenever something is experienced. "The truth of all 
~ntological structures is their power of expressing that which makes the 
' ·'subject-object structure possible. They constitute this structure; they are not 
·· '.controlled by it. .. 7 9 It is this ontological structure of being which remains a 
; 
.. 
·relatively static element underlying all historical change.SO This does not . /· 
' , ' however that there is fixed human in history. On the ·'.mean a nature contrary, 
: 
Tillich that human is dynamic in history. Despite this argues nature 
universal character of the structure of being, humanity is limited by the 
16/bid., p. 24. 
77 Jbid. 
18systematic, vol. I, pp. 215-216. 
19/bid., p. 169. 
80/bid., pp. 163ff 
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experience of non-being. This experience of being limited by non-being is 
finitude. 
For humanity, the finite limits of time and space participate in the 
ontological structure positively as courage and negatively as anxiety. 81 With 
the limit of time there is both the anxiety of having to die as well as the 
courage of being in the present moment. 8 2 With the limit of space, there is 
the anxiety that stems from the insecurity of not having an absolute and 
certain place to be as well as the courage that comes from affirming one's 
being in space at any given moment. For Tillich, the questions that are 
implied in our situation in which we are limited by finitude but yet participate 
within elements of the infinite are answered with the reality of God 
experienced as our ultimate concern. 
God is the name for that which concerns us ultimately. As a being, God 
does not exist. In order to exist as a being God would be limited by the 
subject/object structure of finitude. God is beyond this structure. God is the 
~xperience of being itself which concerns us ultimately.83 Tillich explains: 
' . 
. ;. .. ' , 
God would not be God if he were not the creative ground of everything that has 
being, that, in fact, he is the infinite and unconditional power of being or, in the 
most radical abstraction, that he is being-itself. In this respect God is neither 
alongside things nor even 'above' them; he is nearer to them than they are to 
themselves. He is their creative ground, here and now, always and everywhere.84 
... 
' 
· Being itself is the link connecting the finite with the infinite. It can be 
81 fbid., pp. 189ff. Note that Macquarrie as well stresses the the mood of anxiety in the 
experience of being. See John Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1977), pp. 86 ff. 
8 2For a full discussion of the aspects of anxiety and courage see Paul Tillich, The Courage 
to Be (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952). 
83/bid., pp. 205ff. 
84systematic, vol. II, p. 7. 
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experienced in all things as that which influences the essential structure of 
our very being, and consequently, concerns us ultimately. It functions as 
both that which is experienced as the infinite, the unconditional, and as 
ultimate concern but is manifest through the concrete elements of reality. 
Thus, any concrete assertion about God, which is forced to use finite 
experience and elements, must be symbolic. 
Tillich expresses his understanding of "symbol" by 
distinguishing it from the term "sign". 8 5 For him, both a symbol and sign 
share in the function of pointing to something beyond themselves. For the 
sign, there is no other function than to represent something else. This is 
illustrated by Tillich with the example of the letter "A" pointing to the sound of 
its pronunciation. On the other hand, a symbol, although pointing to 
something other than itself, also participates in the meaning and power of the 
reality to which it points. The example that Tillich uses is a flag that points to 
and participates within the reality and power of a king or nation. Thus, 
ultimate concern can only be expressed with symbols that, on the one hand 
I 
· p,oint to it, but also function and participate within it. This essential 
,, ·~elationship between the use of symbol and ultimate concern is demonstrated 
'' 
; by Tillich's understanding of God. He says: 
• !-
' . ' 
' : 
We could not be in communication with God if he were only 'ultimate being.' But in 
our relationship to him we encounter him with the highest of what we ourselves 
are, person . And so in the symbolic form of speaking about him, we have both 
that which transcends infinitely our experience of ourselves as persons, and that 
which is so adequate to our being persons that we can say, 'Thou' to God, and can 
pray to him. 8 6 
85Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture, ed. Robert C. Kimball (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1959), pp. 61ff. 
86/bid., pp. 61-62. 
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For Tillich, God understood with the symbol of being itself is the underlying 
structure of all reality and provides the solution to the problems implied in the 
finitude of humanity. By bridging the gap between our finite limits and the 
infinite, the experience of being-itself is one of ultimate concern. 
Ultimate Concern and Existence 
In the second section we analyzed Tillich's understanding of humanity's 
essential nature as manifest in the ontological categories of being. There was a 
correlation between the limits of finitude with the presence of God as being 
itself. In this section I will focus on Tillich's analysis of humanity's self-
estrangement within existence (in a sense, what one should not be). There is a 
correlation between the questions that arise out of humanity's self-estranged 
existence and the answers that come from the Christ (one who is in existence 
but not estranged from his essence). Thus, I will identify the questions 
· iimplied in humanity's self-estranged existence and illustrate how Christ -
. ' . 
: paradoxically existing in essential being - as the New Being is an ultimate 
. 
·concern. 
' . 
. :/ As with being in the state of finitude, being in existence means having 
-~· being that stands out of non-being.87 Naturally, the question is how do they .. 
· differ? In finitude, humanity's essential being is separated from self because 
the self, bound to the subject/object structure of time and space, is limited by 
elements of non-being. In existence, essential being is separated from self 
because of humanity's decision to actualize its potential power of being into 
87 Systematic, vol. II, pp. 20ff. 
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the finite structure of existence. For Tillich, potentiality is the power of being 
which has not yet realized its power. All things have being and the potential 
to actualize it; only humanity has actualized this potential, and thus, entered 
into existence. Tillich discusses the relationship between the potentiality in 
the being of "treehood" and the actualization of the "tree" in his back yard: 
Treehood does not exist, although it has being, namely, potential being. But the 
tree in my back yard does exist. It stands out of the mere potentiality of treehood. 
But it stands out and exists only because it participates in that power of being 
which is treehood, that power which makes every tree a tree and nothing else.8 8 
The instant some-thing becomes a thing it is actualized into the finite limits 
of existence. Humanity, possessing the ability to recognize being and its 
potential for actualization combined with the freedom and ability to do so, has 
chosen to "come into being" (exist). Tillich points out that this is what the 
Genesis creation myth is attempting to convey. 8 9 The serpent, representing 
the actualization of the power of being into existence, tempts humanity into 
~hoosing to exist apart from its essence (metaphorically illustrated by acting 
' .against the God, or essential being). 
Tillich does make a further distinction between finitude and existence. 
· ; .!le maintains that finitude, in itself, is good, but under the conditions of 
. '' 
;·'.existential estrangement it is destructive.90 The question: how is it that we can 
' · exist limited by finitude and hope to come closer to our essence is answered by 
the reality of the Christ. 
For Tillich, Christ is the "New Being" which conquered the 
88/bid., p. 21. 
89/bid., pp. 39-44. 
90/bid., pp. 7lff. 
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estrangement of existence and paradoxically existed essentially. The term 
"New Being" simply reflects Christ's unique ability to eliminate the gap 
between existence and essence.91 Tillich points out that this is similar to 
Paul's use of the term "new creature." Jesus is the Christ precisely because he 
was one-- there is no trace of separation between him and his essential being 
(God). He has finite freedom under the conditions of time and space, but is not 
estranged from the ground of his being. 
The reality of Christ, for Tillich, cannot be experienced as a result of 
historical data alone. For Tillich, "Faith itself is the immediate (not mediated 
by conclusions) evidence of the New Being within and under the conditions of 
existence ... 92 Thus, for him, the foundation of Christianity is not historical but 
rather existential. The issue here is the way existential awareness of the 
Christ is manifest in present reality as well as in history. Later I will focus 
specifically on the role of ultimate concern and history, for now, it is 
important to recognize that Tillich's emphasis is upon faith in the existential 
~xperience of Christ as the New Being rather than historical evidence. He 
, .says, "The risk of faith is existential; it concerns the totality of our being while 
• · the risk of historical judgments is theoretical and open to permanent 
~ ·scientific 
• t .. 
correction ... 9 3 It is important to keep in mind that Tillich 
·;: understands historical criticism as well as philosophy to be scientific 
disciplines that attempt an external objective analysis of reality. What makes 
Jesus the Christ is the unity of his existence with his essence. And as 
mentioned before, essential being cannot be understood objectively; it 
9 1Jbid., p. 119. 
92/bid., p. 114. 
93/bid., p. 117. 
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transcends the subject/object structure of finitude. Thus, Tillich stresses that 
Jesus, as the Christ, can only be experienced existentially in faith. This 
existential experience of Christ as the New Being is what bridges the 2000 year 
gap between the original Christian event and the contemporary Christian.9 4 
What makes Jesus the Christ ultimately significant for humanity is the 
verity of his existence as well as the experience of his essence. Thus, in 
discussing the cross and resurrection event of Christ it is important to 
maintain elements of fact as well as symbol. Facts are needed to convey the 
existential elements of the reality of Jesus and symbols are needed to convey 
the essential experience of Christ as revelation, being and ultimate concern.9 5 
Christ, overcoming the gap between existence and essence gives humanity 
ultimate hope and meaning. This realization of Jesus becoming united with 
the New Being in an ecstatic experience is what is conveyed with the symbol 
of the resurrection. For Tillich, this realization is what characterizes faith. 
r 
r . 
Faith is based on the experience of being grasped by the power of the New Being 
through which the destructive consequences of estrangement are conquered. It is 
the certainty of one's own victory over the death of existential estrangement which 
creates the certainty of the Resurrection of the Christ as event and symbol; but it 
is not historical conviction or the acceptance of biblical authority which creates 
this certainty.9 6 
, .. 
. , 
:.This faith in the experience of the Christ as New Being is of ultimate concern 
for humanity. It concerns the totality of our very being . It concerns the 
ultimately new toward which history is moving. Christ as the New Being is the 
end and aim of history. 
94Jbid., p. 136. 
951 bid., pp. 154ff. 
96/bid., p. 155. 
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Ultimate Concern and Life 
In section two, we analyzed Tillich's understanding of humanity's 
essential nature in the correlation between being and ultimate concern. In 
the last section we focused upon the humanity's estranged existence correlated 
with the unity of Christ. However, these are both abstractions of the complex 
interrelation between essential and existential characteristics in reality. In 
this section we will need to analyze Tillich's conception of the complex and 
dynamic unity of life. There is a correlation between the questions implied in 
the ambiguities of humanity's essential nature intertwined within existence 
and the answers given by the Spirit which is our ultimate concern. 
Tillich maintains that it is through the evolutionary process that 
humanity acquired the ability to recognize the potentialities of being and with 
it, the freedom to actualize them.97 The inorganic as well as the organic, 
grounded in being, has the potential for becoming our ultimate concern; and 
:consequently. is of immense theological significance. However the very 
t 
• r .attempt to recognize these ultimate concerns is distorted by the ambiguities of 
, · our existentially estranged condition. Because humanity is bound to the finite ,• 
• , subject/object structure of reality there is always the temptation of .. ~ 
'::'identifying the particular bearer of an ultimate concern with the ultimate 
concern itself. Tillich refers to this as the demonic. 9 8 The demonic is 
manifest whenever there is a distortion of the self-transcendent experience of 
an ultimate concern. The demonic differs from the profane which resists self-
transcendence. For Tillich, humanity continually strives to overcome these 
97 Systematic., vol. III, p. 16. 
98/bid., p. 102. 
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ambiguities of life and seeks the unambiguous life. This quality of 
unambiguous life is represented with the symbol of the Spirit. 
The Spirit manifests itself in the human dimension of the spirit. Tillich 
defines spirit (with a small "s") as that function of life which characterizes 
humanity as humanity and is actualized in morality, culture and religion.99 It 
is also understood as the symbol which represents the manifestation of the 
Divine Spirit in humanity. Within the spirit, power of being is united with the 
meaning of being and can be defined as the actualization of the power and 
meaning of being in unity. Under the presence of the Spirit, it is the human 
spirit which is grasped by ultimate concern and experiences ecstasy. The 
human spirit in life is ambiguous. When this human spirit is grasped by the 
Divine Spirit, life becomes unambiguous. Tillich gives this manifestation of 
the Divine Spirit, which creates unambiguous life, the name of faith. 
Faith in this sense is the state of being grasped by ultimate concern. IO O 
In this sense, all people have faith because all people have ultimate concerns. 
'This faith occurs in the dynamics, structure and functions of the human 
r .spirit. In the receptive character of faith, the human spirit is opened up by 
' . the presence of the Spirit. In faith's paradoxical character, the human spirit 
. ' 
; · accepts the presence of the Divine Spirit despite the tremendous gap between 
• ! 
' 
':: them. And in faith's anticipatory character, the human spirit expects to 
participate in the transcendent unity of the unambiguous life created by the 
presence of the Divine Spirit. IO I These characteristics of faith demonstrate 
the correlation between the ambiguities in the life of the human spirit and the 
99/bid., p. 111. 
IOOJbid., pp. 130ff. 
101 Jbid., p. I33. 
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unambiguous presence of the Divine Spirit which is experienced as ultimate 
concern. 
Ultimate Concern and History 
This final section of Tillich's Systematic Theology, as with the first 
section on reason. is treated somewhat separately from the central portion of 
the system (sections 2-4 ). Despite the fact that history is a significant element 
throughout the whole of the system, Tillich believes it is helpful to treat it 
separately. There is a correlation between the questions implied in the 
ambiguities of history with the answers within the symbol of the Kingdom of 
God. We will first analyze Tillich's understanding of the historical dimension 
in general which belongs to all life processes and realms of life. Secondly. we 
will tum to what Tillich calls "history proper," that is. history which is 
dependent on the human spirit and occurs in humanity alone. We will focus 
on the questions implied in both of these aspects of history and attempt to 
· ,'correlate them with the answers in the element of ultimate concern in the . . 
, ·.symbol of the Kingdom of God. 
· . For Tillich, there is a distinction between an historical happening and 
• l 
• 
·.=an historical event. Within reality there is an inexhaustible amount of 
happenings and occurrences that continually take place. These happenings 
do not become historical events until they are perceived and interpreted by 
humanity. "Every event is a syndrome (a running together) of facts and 
interpretation." 102 The bearers and receivers within a particular tradition 
l 02 Ibid., p. 302. 
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unite the historical happenings with symbolic interpretation. This "historical 
consciousness" is manifest within the memories and recollections of the 
members of a tradition that is continually passed from generation to 
generation. The criteria for realizing and accepting a particular historical 
happening as an event is dependent upon the particular occurrence's value 
and meaning for a particular tradition. "In this respect history is dependent 
on the historical consciousness of a group. 01 l O 3 
For Tillich, there are four characteristics of human history. The first is 
its connection with purpose. A historical event is generally characterized by 
actions with a purpose. The second is its connection with freedom. By striving 
for the possible purposes, humanity transcends the actual situation and is free. 
The third is its striving for the new. All historical events are unique. And 
finally, the fourth characteristic of human history is its universal, particular, 
teleological significance. Just how it is that a historical happening is 
recognized and interpreted as an historical event with the characteristics of 
~uman history depends upon a specific criteria or key within a group . 
. 1 • Thus, for Tillich the direct bearers of history are groups of centered 
, '.communities. Because of the limits of finitude they depend upon a particular 
; · . key to recognize and interpret limitless historical happenings . . /. .. . , 
At this point the question is: Which group and which vocational consciousness are 
able to give a key to history as a whole? Obviously, if we try to answer, we have 
already presupposed an interpretation of history with a claim to universality; we 
have already used the key in justifying its use. This is an unavoidable 
consequence of the 'theological circle' within which systematic theology moves; but 
it is and unavoidable circle wherever the question of the ultimate meaning of 
history is asked. I 0 4 
103/bid., p. 301. 
104/bid. 
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The questions of the ultimate meaning of history that arise out of the 
ambiguities in the dimension of history are answered through symbol of the 
Kingdom of God which becomes our ultimate concern. 
The Kingdom of God has two aspects: an inner historical side which 
allows it to participate in the dynamics of history, and a transhistorical side 
which answers the questions implied in the ambiguities of the dynamics of 
history.105 These aspects embrace all aspects of reality. The central 
manifestation of the Kingdom of God is in the appearance of Jesus as the 
Christ. "The metaphor 'center' expresses a moment in history for which 
everything before and after is both preparation and reception." I 0 6 The point 
at which the human situation received this manifestation is understood as the 
"fulfillment of time"-- the Kairos. Tillich stresses that the Churches 
continually experience Kairoi in which the Kingdom of God manifests itself 
in particular breakthroughs. He defines the relationship between the central 
Kairos to the Kairoi as "the relation of the criterion to that which stands 
·under the criterion and the relation of the source of power to that which is 
I 
I • 
, : nourished by the source of power." I 0 7 The awareness of a particular Kairos is 
'not a matter of a detached, objective analysis; but rather, a matter of an 
; . 
'!b.volved experience. However, observation and analysis do not produce the . . 
'·" experience of the Kairos, they are important to the extent that they help to 
objectify and clarify the experience. The fragmentary victories of the 
Kingdom of God in history point to the non-fragmentary side of the Kingdom 
of God above history. For Tillich, it is the central Kai ro s and the various 
I 05 lbid., p. 357. 
I 06 /bid., p. 364. 
107 Ibid., p. 370. 
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Kairoi that determine the dynamics of history in its self-transcendence. 
The Kingdom of God is also understood as the end of history. End is 
understood in the finite sense as the elimination of history as we know it, and 
as the aim toward which the temporal process points to as its goal. "History is, 
so to speak, the earthly realm out of which individuals are moved into the 
heavenly realm. n l 08 For Tillich, history is the process by which humanity 
crosses from the temporal realm of finitude to the essential realm of the 
infinite. This end or final goal of history is described as "Eternal Life." 
In eternal life, all polarities of existence are brought into perfect 
balance. There is no longer morality, for there is no "ought to be." What is, is 
only what is. There is no culture, for there is no truth which is not also done. 
Finally, within eternal life there is no religion, for religion results from 
humanity's estrangement from its own ground of being. In eternal life, 
humanity's existence and essence are one. "The eternal act of creation is 
driven by a love which finds fulfillment only through the other one who has 
the freedom to reject and to accept love. God, so to speak, drives toward the 
I 
: , ~ctualization and essentialization of everything that has being. 11 l 0 9 
From this analysis we have seen that Tillich uses the concept of ultimate 
. " . ·concern to account for the complex and diverse nature of revelation. In 
summary. I will refer back to the questions that were posed in the beginning 
of the chapter. First, Tillich's notion of ultimate concern could not fall under 
Dulles' model of doctrine as revelation. For Tillich, the transcendent character 
of revelation as being itself which is experienced as humanity's ultimate 
108/bid., p. 397. 
109 Jbid., p. 422. 
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concern can not be identified with any particular thing. To say that a 
particular doctrine is revelation is a misunderstanding which Tillich refers to 
as the demonic. In a similar way, ultimate concern can not be identified with 
history. Tillich recognizes that revelation as ultimate concern is mediated 
through historical events, but to confuse the events themselves for the actual 
revelation again is a demonic distortion. Ultimate concern is more closely 
linked with Dulles' third model of revelation as personal experience. Although 
Tillich certainly recognizes that an ultimate concern stemming from the 
recognition of being itself transcending the subject/object structure of reality 
is an internal personal experience, he differs from Dulles' third model by 
claiming that ultimate concern is mediated through experience rather than 
claiming that it is experience itself. Ultimate concern is also related to Dulles' 
fourth model of revelation as dialectical presence. The concept of ultimate 
concern certainly stresses the transcendent otherness of revelation; however, 
there is not as much of a void between humanity and God for Tillich. All 
. things are capable of becoming a medium of revelation and all people are 
I 
'. ·. r • capable of recognizing an ultimate concern. Whereas the dialectical presence 
~ . model stresses that faith is required for one to be grasped by revelation, 
; ~ lillich's stresses that faith is the state of being grasped by an ultimate 
. . • 
concern. Tillich's notion of ultimate concern is most similar to Dulles' fifth 
model of revelation understood as new awareness. The experience of 
revelation does not stem from any particular source nor is it identified with 
any particular thing; rather, it is an elevation of one's consciousness allowing 
the recognition of being-itself to become an ultimate concern. 
With regard to the questions arising from Niebuhr's analysis of 
revelation, Tillich deals both with the relativity of history as well as with the 
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difficulty of the historical gap by stressing the ontological character of 
revelation. Even though Tillich recognizes that history is an important 
element in recognizing ultimate concern, he maintains that what history 
mediates is not relative, nor is it in need of being interpreted. Being itself, by 
its very nature goes beyond the subject/object structure of historical events, 
people, and documents. It is here where we see that Tillich is much more 
concerned with the end result of revelation and less with the means. There 
needs to be more detail explaining the interrelation between the dynamic 
elements of history which function as a medium for the static, universal 
conception of revelation as being itself. One must question the amount of 
significance Tillich gives to history itself. Clearly he stresses that what 
matters is the experience of the divine through history, but this experience is 
only possible within history. Thus, it is just as important to focus on history as 
well as the experience of revelation which is manifest through it. We will see 
in the following chapter that Pannenberg is much more concerned with 
~roviding a detailed explanation of how the dynamic nature of history 
! 
r{unctions in the experience of the reality of revelation. 
We have seen in this chapter that Tillich has spent much time dealing 
; ·with the many issues which we discussed in chapter one with regard to 
• ,t 
• 
": =Macquarrie's understanding of revelation with ontological categories. Like 
Macquarrie, Tillich stresses that revelation occurs as a result of being grasped 
by being-itself. The experience of this ontological reality which is part of all 
things, people, and events becomes our ultimate concern. 
We have seen that the questions arising from Kaufman's stress on the 
interrelation of both historical elements as well as ontological elements were 
discussed by Tillich. He recognizes that history can function as a medium for 
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ultimate concern, but lacks the necessary detail explaining the interrelation 
between the universal nature of ultimate concern with the relative ways in 
which history can be interpreted and understood. 
Finally, with regard to the questions stemming from Cook's analysis of 
the hermeneutical elements involved in attempting to overcome the gap 
between universal faith and particular history with a metaphoric process, we 
see that Tillich is not as concerned with the details of how it occurs and much 
more concerned with stressing that it occurs. He rightly recognizes the 
ontological, universal structure of revelation as ultimate concern, but in light 
of the multitude of recent developments in historical/critical and 
hermeneutical theory there needs to be a more detailed explanation of the 
interrelation between interpretation and revelation. Wolfhart Pannenberg is 
much more concerned with this interrelation. 
Thus I will now turn to an analysis of his understanding of revelation as 
universal history. We will see that he is much more concerned with how we 
~xperience revelation rather than exactly what we experience. After 
: , .examining his theory, I will attempt to demonstrate that a more thorough and 
. 
• complete understanding of revelation is possible by combining elements of 
' 
'' 
; ·Tillich's stress on the ontological structure of experiencing revelation as 
.. 
·:·ultimate concern with elements of Pannenberg's focus on the details of how a 
universal recognition of revelation is possible in light of recent developments 
in historical/critical and hermeneutic al theory. 
CHAPTER III 
REVELATION AS UNIVERSAL HISTORY IN THE THOUGHT OF 
WOLFHARTPANNENBERG 
In attempting to grasp the way in which Wolfhart Pannenberg 
understands revelation, one is forced to acknowledge the significance he gives 
to the term "truth." It is clear that Pannenberg's understanding of· truth is at 
the ground of his understanding of the revelation of God. There are many 
facets to Pannenberg's understanding of truth: the function of scripture, 
Christ, finitude, history, tradition, reason, and culture. There are several 
overarching principles which govern and pervade the whole of his thought . 
. These principles include eschatology as the key to scripture, to doctrine, and to 
: : ·the consummative structure of reality. In this chapter, we will attempt to 
~ , trace these themes within the historical development of Pannenberg's 
' ~~bought. 
• . .
From the very beginning, and continuing through today. Pannenberg's 
theology focuses on eschatology as the key which unlocks ultimate meaning 
and truth in reality. Pannenberg's initial focus and concern has been on the 
significance of scripture in light of eschatology. Thus we will begin this 
chapter by taking a brief look at the role of eschatology and scripture and how 
they function as elements of universal history. Following this emphasis on 
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scripture, Pannenberg focuses on the significance of doctrine in light of 
eschatology. Thus we will look at the role of eschatology and the doctrine of 
Jesus Christ and how they function as elements of universal history. 
Following this emphasis on doctrine, Pannenberg focuses on the significance 
of the consummative structure of reality in light of eschatology. This focus on 
the consummative structure of all reality continues today and is the most 
recent position taken by Pannenberg. Thus, we will conclude this chapter by 
looking at the role of eschatology and the various elements of reality in its 
consummative structure as universal history. 
Revelation as Scripture and Eschatology 
With regard to the interpretation of scripture, Pannenberg stresses that 
Christianity must struggle to unify the particular revelation of Christ 
available in scripture, and the general, universal revelation of God in all 
ihings.110 Pannenberg notes two significant problems which modern 
'.- r rheology must face with regard to itself and scripture: on the one hand there is 
' 
' , the distance between a literal interpretation of scripture and its own 
' immediate historical content; on the other is the distance between 
• . l 
. ·"' 
: ·contemporary theology and primitive theology ,111 Pannenberg emphasizes 
that the texts of the Bible must be understood primarily in relation to their 
immediate environment. The exegetical task is to interpret scripture first as it 
was intended by its authors for its readers. The problem is to bridge the gap 
that exists between the actual history of Jesus and the multiple New Testament 
1 lOBasic., vol. I, p. 1. 
l 11 tbid., p. 6. 
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interpretations of it, on the one hand; and, on the other, the gap between the 
intellectual milieu of the New Testament and ours.112 For Pannenberg, these 
connections are possible within the horizon of the process of history itself. By 
focusing on the whole of reality present in universal history which 
encompasses the true place (sitz im Leben) of the various authors of scripture 
as well as the contemporary world one can attempt to bridge the gap. In 
discussing the act of interpreting the text of the New Testament Pannenberg 
says, 
Only a conception of the actual course of history linking the past with the present 
situation and its horizon of the future can form the comprehensive horizon within 
which the interpreter's limited horizon of the present and the historical horizon of 
the text fuse together .1 1 3 
This is the only way the past and present horizons can be maintained in their 
uniqueness. For Pannenberg, all things, events, and people are part of a 
comprehensive continuity of history. Pannenberg's understanding of history 
is not primarily concerned with either the record of past events, or the 
; chronological record of events, but rather with the inquiry and discovery of a 
' , 
; universal, comprehensive, continuity of meaning which connects all things, 
. . events, and people.114 This unity is understood as the wholeness of truth 
• ,t 
.• ~which is partially manifest within the collective consciousness of humanity. 
l 12/bid., p. 8. 
l 13/bid., p. 129. 
114 In briefly looking at the etymology of the term "history. n it is interesting to note the 
similarity between Pannenberg's understanding of the word with the Latin and Greek roots 
meaning-- inquiry, knowing, and learning. For Pannenberg, it is a universal sense of 
history which discloses the meaning of events. 
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Revelation as Doctrine and Eschatology 
For Pannenberg, what is essential to any study of Christ is the emphasis 
on who Jesus was. This focus should be concerned with unfolding the 
Christian community's confession which is grounded in the activity of Jesus in 
the past.115 In the midst of this past, Pannenberg sees the tremendous 
eschatological hope that was such an integral part of primitive Christianity, 
and which continues to remain a primary characteristic of the Christian faith. 
He says, "Thus the task of Christology is to establish the true understanding of 
Jesus' significance from his history, which can be described comprehensively 
by saying that in this man God is revealed.11 116 
For Pannenberg, the primary significance of the event of Christ's 
resurrection stems from the eschatological hope which it fulfilled. The 
experience of Jesus after he was dead was understood as an experience of the 
end (recalling the Greek eschatos meaning "last" or "farthest"). The profound 
~ignificance that the early Christians found in the resurrection event was the 
'./conviction that it was bound to the last event in history (es ch at on) . . ·, .. 
~' Pannenberg concludes that "the eschatological event of the appearance of 
·' 
, Christ is the summation of the universe from its end in that this event has 
• .l 
• /consummating power in the fullness of time."11 7 This event has 
consummating, or final power, in the fullness, or overall whole of reality. It is 
this final and future event of history which allows humanity to understand 
the essence and meaning of all individual occurrences whose "meaning is 
115wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus • God and Man (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 
1968), p. 28. 
116/bid., p. 30. 
111 Jbid., p. 388. 
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relative to the whole to which it belongs. 11 l l 8 "Through giving up its 
particularity, everything is mediated with the whole and, transcending its 
finitude, with God, who nevertheless wanted this particularity to exist within 
the whole of his creation." 119 We derive the words with which we speak of the 
eschatological reality that has appeared in Jesus from the experience of a 
reality that is not yet the reality of the eschaton. For this reason, all 
statements of Christology have only metaphorical meaning. They are valid 
only to the extent that they are motivated by thinking through the history of 
Jesus. They are always only exegesis of the history of Jesus and remain in 
need of expansion and correction in the light of the eschatological future. 
Only the eschaton will ultimately disclose what really happened in Jesus' 
resurrection from the dead. Until then, we must speak favorably in 
thoroughly legitimate, but still only metaphorical and symbolic, form about 
Jesus' resurrection and the significance inherent in it.12 0 
As a result of the profound effect this eschatological expectation had 
1;1pon history, climaxing in the experience of the resurrection of Jesus, 
: r J>annenberg concludes that the event of the resurrection should be understood 
~ as a historical event. In his well known work Jesus- God and Man, he says: . 
·- ,£: .. . . 
Thus the resurrection of Jesus would be designated as a historical event in this 
sense: If the emergence of primitive Christianity, which, apart from other 
traditions, is also traced back by Paul to appearances of the resurrected Jesus, can 
be understood in spite of all critical examination of the tradition only if one 
examines it in the light of the eschatological hope for a resurrection from the dead, 
then that which is so designated is a historical event, even if we do not know 
anything more particular about it.1 2 1 
118/bid., p. 391. 
119 /bid., p. 396. 
120/bid., p. 397. 
l 21 /bid., p. 98. 
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Out of the early Christian's eschatological hope, which was generated by a set 
of historical circumstances, arose the powerful understanding and experience 
of Jesus Christ after he was dead. Pannenberg stresses that this was certainly 
an experience which had significant historical repercussions. It is in this 
sense that the event of the resurrection is to be thought of as a historical 
event. 
Pannenberg's understanding of history is tied with the experience of 
humanity which goes far beyond the more narrow, focused emphasis that 
much of contemporary science designates as reality. In this respect 
Pannenberg says, "The judgment about whether an event, however 
unfamiliar, has happened or not is in the final analysis a matter for the 
historian and cannot be prejudged by the knowledge of natural science.122 It 
is not that Pannenberg discredits the results and truth of the disciplines of 
science, but stresses that it is in the very nature of science to "declare its own 
~nability to make definitive judgements about the possibility or impossibility 
:. r .of an individual event, regardless of how certainly it is able, at least in 
. 
' ,principle, to measure the probability of an event's occurrence."123 For 
; Pannenberg, it is in the very nature of history to focus on a broader horizon 
•. 4 
. •"' 
:fof experience than any scientific analysis. Historical analysis is more 
inclusive and comprehensive, whereas scientific analysis is more particular 
and precise. 
Because the event of the resurrection is understood from a historical 
point of view rather than a scientific one, it can only be expressed in the 
122/bid. 
I23lbid. 
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metaphoric language of eschatological expectation. The experience of Jesus 
after he was dead, is expressed using the metaphor of a resurrection from the 
dead. There is no scientific certainty, nor any complete understanding of 
what exactly happened 2000 years ago, except for the fact, verified by much 
historical testimony, that the tremendously profound reality of Jesus was, and 
continues to be, experienced. Pannenberg points out that this mythological 
way of describing and thinking about experience "has come increasingly into 
conflict with the scientific understanding of the world and has thereby 
become a dead weight hindering the Christian message." 124 He goes on to say 
that "even the element of truth in the myth can be made valid today only in a 
way of thinking that is, in principle, unmythological." 125 For this reason, 
thinking about the point of departure for theology in terms of historical 
events is increasingly important in modem times. This shift from a 
mythological to a historical way of understanding truth allows Pannenberg to 
express the reality of religious truth in a language which contemporary 
culture can understand. This shift in language is acceptable because it still 
I 
: manages to point to the ultimate reality which is expressed by the original 
' "myth. 
' 
Pannenberg is concerned with the language which the contemporary 
, •"' 
;world uses to think and struggles to understand itself. What has changed by 
understanding oneself in mythological terms to understanding oneself in 
terms of historical fact and scientific verification may not be the truth of the 
early Christian experience, but simply the language and terms themselves 
which we use to think about and understand our experience. 
124/bid., p. 186. 
125 Jbid., p. 186. 
Rather than 
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attempt to rehash the validity and the truth inherent in the mythological way 
of understanding reality, Pannenberg has provided a re-evaluation of what 
history and science mean in light of experience in general, and the early 
Christian experience of Jesus' resurrection in particular. Pannenberg hopes 
this focus will allow contemporary culture to grasp meaning in the more 
comprehensive view of history. He, like Tillich, finds it increasingly difficult 
to express meaningful experience in modern symbols and language.126 In 
modern culture, the development of more inclusive, broader ways of 
understanding the world and reality have become extremely urgent. 
Pannenberg's solution is understanding the world from the point of view of a 
universal history. 
Revelation as Consummative Reality and Eschatoloi:y 
Universal History and Truth 
•. r, For Pannenberg, the primary characteristic of what Christians call God 
.., is the universal unity of truth within past, present, and future experience of . 
. . 
~ all reality. 
11.:. 
Thus, in an attempt to understand his view of revelation as 
.. 
'::universal history, it is necessary to begin with his broader understanding of 
truth in general. In volume two of Pannenberg's Basic Question in Theology 
he begins his article, "What is Truth?," by saying, "The Question about the 
truth of the Christian message has to do with whether it can still disclose to us 
126"Since the split between a faith unacceptable to culture and a culture unacceptable to 
faith was not possible for me, the only alternative was to attempt to interpret the symbols 
of faith through expressions of our own culture." see Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, 
(University of Chicago, 1963), vol. III, pp. 4-5. 
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today the unity of the reality in which we live" _12 7 According to Pannenberg, 
it is that characteristic of the Christian message which allows one to grasp the 
unity of reality which has been present from the beginning and is chiefly 
responsible for the success of Christianity. He stresses that what is at the core 
of Christianity is not a variety of particular truths, but truth itself, "which in 
essence can only be one." 12 8 Pannenberg refers to this aspect of truth as its 
"constancy," which is understood as the agreement of truth with itself. In 
Pannenberg's view, this understanding of truth is grounded both in Hebrew as 
well as Greek thought. For the Hebrews, the unity of truth was evident in 
their confidence and faith in the constancy of the self-disclosure of Yahweh. 
The Greeks, on the other hand, looked toward the constancy of truth by 
focusing on its agreement with itself. For Pannenberg, this element of the 
constancy of truth and its self-disclosure, demonstrates the necessity for its 
unity. 129 This understanding of truth as a unified, constant revelation is the 
substance of any theology. The very task of any systematic theology is 
essentially bound to the "construction of the path of the revelation of God and, 
· r
1 
thus, of the unity of truth." 1 3 0 .· . 
This unity of truth is one with reality which, for Pannenberg, exists 
throughout all of history and is not simply in present, empirical happenings, 
~# .. 
. ·:as much of modern science maintains.131 For Pannenberg, this unity of truth 
is concerned with everything real, and thus cannot only be limited to things 
127wolfhart Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology (Philadelphia: The Westminster 
Press, 1970), vol. II, p. 1. 
128/bid. 
129/bid., p. 11. 
130 Ibid., p. 16. 
131see Alfred J. Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (London: Macmillian & 
co., 1962), especially pp. 78ff. 
67 
of the present world.132 "Its unity should instead also embrace the peoples 
and cultures of distant times, for whom the whole of reality presented itself 
differently from the way it does for us today." 13 3 Thus, for Pannenberg, truth 
necessarily takes on a historical aspect: truth itself has a history. In fact, it is 
truth itself which functions as the substance of history. "Historical change 
itself must be thought of as the essence of truth if its unity is still to be 
maintained without narrow-mindedly substituting a particular perspective for 
the whole of truth."134 The problem here is the two handed necessity of 
isolating particular aspects of truth when referring to particular events and 
individuals of the present or past, while maintaining the sense of the 
wholeness of truth that is essential if any attempt to grasp the meaning of any 
of the particulars is to be made. 
For Pannenberg, Hegel's system is the best example to date of a solution 
to this problem.135 For Hegel, truth was not viewed as a particular product 
already complete, but rather as the process of history itself. For Hegel, what 
~overns the movement of the truth through history is the absolute. The 
t 
: . r ~efinitive difference between Hegel's and Pannenberg's views of the unity of 
., ' truth within history is Hegel's exclusion and Pannenberg's inclusion of an . 
;· eschatology.136 Pannenberg's most significant criticism of Hegel's 
» ~ .. 
; :conception of the unity of truth is directed to his failure to provide any means 
1321n order to understand Pannenberg here, it is necessary to understand what he 
understands to be "real." For him, the "real" is not bound to sensory experience of the 
present moment, nor even in thoughts and ideas within the present moment. Pannenberg's 
understanding of reality is bound with his understanding of truth. What is real, for 
Pannenberg, is truth in itself which stretches the span of history. 
133 fbid., p. 20. 
134 fbid., p. 20. 
135 fbid., p. 21. 
136For a look at Hegel's view see G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind tr. J.B. 
Baillie, intro. George Lichtheim (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), p. 82. 
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of understanding the whole of truth. For Pannenberg, any conception of the 
unity of truth is dependent upon a view of its future. This future orientation, 
or eschatology, provides the necessary wholeness to any view of the truth as a 
unity. 
Pannenberg points out that for Christians, it is Jesus' resurrection from 
the dead which provides a sense of the whole of reality and truth by providing 
a glimpse of the end. This solution is satisfactory because it "protects the 
openness of the future and the contingency of events, and still holds fast to 
the ultimacy of what appeared in Jesus, which makes possible the unity of 
truth." 131 Only by viewing truth with a past, present, and future is the 
meaning and essence of any of the particulars of experience evident. This 
view of the whole comes about through the process of history itself. In effect, 
it is history itself which reveals more and more of the whole and thus gives 
more and more substance and meaning to all of the particulars of reality. In 
order to gain a better grasp of the essential function of Pannenberg's 
~schatology in his view of truth, it will be helpful if we tum to a more detailed 
~ 
· r~nalysis of the role and function of Christ in his thought. 
.. 
Universal History and Hermeneutic 
"'~ 
For Pannenberg, any understanding of events or people of the past or 
present is dependent on the breadth and comprehensive view of a universal 
history. In discussing interpretation from the perspective of a universal 
history, Pannenberg points out the need for a more comprehensive view of 
events and individuals. "Even significant individual occurrences and 
131/bid., p. 26. 
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historical figures require for their evaluation a view of the broader 
continuities that extend beyond their narrower life-setting and epoch." 1 3 8 
For Pannenberg, the significance of an individual or event is directly related 
to the comprehensiveness with which one relates it with other events and 
individuals. This allows one "to do justice to its true significance." 139 In order 
to get at the meaning of past events and people, as well as current events and 
people, it is necessary to place them in the continuity of meaning in which 
they stand. Pannenberg says, "If the historical distance of what happened in 
the past is retained, then the link connecting the events and forms of the past 
to the present can scarcely be found anywhere else than in the continuity of 
history itself which joins today with yesterday."140 In order for this to 
happen, Pannenberg stresses that it is necessary to expand one's horizon to 
encompass the past, the present and that which joins them both. 
The attempt to understand tradition is similar to the construction of a 
bridge. In constructing this bridge, one is concerned with the construction of 
~he whole of reality which is necessary in order to understand that aspect of 
• 
' vreality which is tied with past tradition and culture. For Pannenberg, 
~,' speaking about the whole of reality and speaking about . God are not two 
entirely different matters, for they mutually condition each other . .. ,. What is 
.... 
'real, true, whole, unified, and "all-determining reality is then - if it be 
personal - to be thought of as the God of this history." 1 4 1 
As discussed above, what is also essential in attempting to understand 
past or present events is the projection of the future. Only by viewing history 
138Basic., vol. I, p. 98. 
139/bid. 
140/bid., p. 113. 
141/bid., pp. 156-57. 
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in its wholeness, based on the eschatological conception of the future in 
Christ, can we attempt to gain a better understanding of meaning within all of 
reality. Humanity's finitude stands in the way of a complete and infinite 
understanding of history and reality. The problem arises when attempting to 
speak of a universal history while maintaining the starting point of human 
finitude: Universal history implies full view of the end-- if this is so, there is 
no need to discuss human finitude. These limits with which humanity must 
live results in a less than absolute, finite perspective of the world. For 
Pannenberg, humanity's finite condition renders any conclusion about the 
truth and meaning of universal history to be questionable.14 2 It is the task of 
humanity to continually attempt to understand all of reality in light of a 
universal history, while continually recognizing that the conclusions are 
always provisional. 
In reflecting on the provisional character of our knowledge of the end of history, 
the horizon of the future could be held open and the finitude of human experience 
preserved. It is precisely this understanding of history as something whose 
totality is given by the fact that its end has become accessible in a provisional and 
anticipatory way that is to be gathered today from the history of Jesus in its 
r, relationship to the Israelite-Jewish tradition.14 3 
' ,J~y maintaining a provisional knowledge, the horizon of the future can be left 
. ·open while preserving humanity's finite condition. 
142/bid., p. 133. 
14 3 Ibid., p. 135. 
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Universal History and Faith and Reason 
Pannenberg, in his essay Faith and Reason, begins with this question: 
Is it perhaps the case that even the tension between faith and reason is possible 
only on the presupposition of a unity which encompasses both, namely, the 
presupposition of the unity of truth? 14 4 
This question suggests his belief that his theory on universal history (whose 
foundation is characterized by the "unity of truth") is the bridge which can 
also link the tremendous gap that has existed between faith and reason. 
Pannenberg believes that a religious subjectivity exists in our society as a 
result of the neglect of positivistic science to include this aspect of humanity. 
For this reason "the task of a rational account of the truth of faith has 
acquired urgency in the modern period." 14 5 At the heart of Pannenberg's 
theory of universal history is the maxim that every individual experience has 
its meaning only in connection with life as a whole. Because of the fact that 
,we are unable to stand at the end of history, a conception of the future is 
' ,. 
'' 
; necessary in order to recognize meaning in any individual event.14 6 This 
conception must link the future with the present and the past. Pannenberg 
!ll\'.l: 
~sums it up in this way: 
Only from such a fore-conception of a final future, and thus of the still unfinished 
144wolfhart Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology (Philadelphia: The Westminster 
Press, 1971), vol. II, p. 47. 
145/bid., p. 53. 
l 461 realize that we have discussed the role of eschatology with regard to truth and Christ 
in the above sections; however, because Pannenberg's eschatology again plays a _significant 
role in this section with regard to the relationship between faith and reason, I felt a brief 
reiteration, applied to the topic at hand, would be helpful. 
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wholeness of reality, is it possible to assign to an individual event or being - be it 
present or past - its definitive meaning by saying what it is. Thus, when someone 
names a thing and says, "This is a rose," or "this is a dog," he always does so from 
the standpoint of an implicit fore-conception of the final future, and of the totality 
of reality that will first be constituted by the final future. For every individual 
has its definitive meaning only within this whole.141 
For Pannenberg, it is not faith alone which is dependent upon an 
eschatological basis in the future. 
A conception of the future is also an essential element for reason as 
well. By maintaining an eschatological conception of the future it is possible 
to place the meaning of everything individual in a context of meaning which 
allows us to say what this is or that is. Pannenberg stresses that it is not true 
that "reason, in contrast to faith, has to do only with what is visible."148 In 
the realm of reason, the process of creativity, stemming from imagination, is a 
result of a conception of the future. For Pannenberg, reason is ultimately 
concerned with only present things. However, it derives its ability to speak 
meaningfully about those present things from an eschatological emphasis that 
faith puts on the future. This emphasis allows for the recognition of meaning 
~· in present things giving reason its very origin. Conversely, the creative 
• , imagination, stemming from reason's conception of the future things. allows 
.Jaith to talk of the eschatological future of individuals, humanity and of the 
, world as a whole. Thus. it becomes clear that for Pannenberg, faith and 
reason mutually assist one another. It is eschatology which functions as the 
link binding the two together. Reason gives rational substance to conception 
of universal history stemming from faith's stress on the unity of truth 
existing wholeness of reality (past, present, and fore-conception of future). 
14 7 Basic., vol. IT, p. 62. 
148/bid., p. 63. 
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Faith, on the other hand can assist reason to focus more on the true meaning 
of present things by its orientation toward a final eschatological future which 
gives wholeness to the unity of truth necessary to grasp the meaning of any 
individual thing. 
This whole of reality or universal history to which we have been 
referring, is not completely different from Pannenberg's understanding of 
God. He believes they mutually condition one another. "God is immanent in 
history in the process of the transmission of his eschatological revelation, 
determining it in its totality from within, from the intra-historical event of 
the history of Jesus." 14 9 For Pannenberg, this all determining reality, if it be 
thought of as personal- is God.150 In the process of continually attempting to 
grasp the continuities of meaning that exist in a universal conception of 
history, one can experience the ultimate, profound, personal revelation of God. 
Universal History and God 
.• Pannenberg correctly points out that the very term "God" has appeared 
> to become "dispensable" and even an "interference" in this day and age of 
science and technology .15 1 Western culture, particularly, has increasingly 
" 
been relying on scientific, empirical evidence to give substance to the whole 
of reality, but as a result, has experienced a loss of personal identity. 
Pannenberg, who sees God as one who provides a supportive framework which 
gives substance and meaning to human life, there is a crisis in the modem 
149/bid., p. 58. 
150/bid., pp. 156-57. 
151/bid., p. 201. 
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world. There is a growing absence of meaning and substance in contemporary 
human life. 
The problem, for Pannenberg, began in the eighteenth century and is 
primarily concerned with the difficulty in understanding God as the all 
determining power, on one hand, and as a person, on the other. "Every 
concept of person conceived in this way includes within itself the finitude of 
man as constitutive element, and therefore is unfit as a designation of the 
infinite power that determines all reality." 15 2 The problem is concerned with 
thinking of God as personal without implying the finite limits which define 
humanity's conception of person.15 3 Pannenberg stresses that Tillich's 
understanding of God as "being itself' strongly emphasizes the limitless, 
infinite characteristics of God, but neglects in showing how God can be 
personal at the same time. 
For Pannenberg, the answer is found in eschatology. Because the future 
provides the necessary missing link to the universal, whole of reality which, 
for Pannenberg is the revelation of God, God exists as the power of the future 
ever the present. 
As the power of the future, God is no thing, no object presently at hand, which man 
could detach himself from and pass over. He appears neither as one being among 
others, nor as the quiescent background of all beings, the timeless being 
underlying all objects.15 4 
152/bid., p. 227. 
15 3 It is very interesting to note that Pannenberg suggests a reversal in the common 
understanding of the issue in that "there is evidence for the view that the phenomenon of 
the personal was not first discovered in relation to man, but had its origin in religious 
experience, in the appearance of the numinous object, and was transferred to man only 
from there." see p. 245. 
I54Basic., vol. II, p. 242. 
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Pannenberg's eschatological solution attempts to remove the category of being 
all together. God's full revelation will only occur at the end of time, finitude, 
and history, when humanity can view reality in its wholeness and totality. In 
a sense, Pannenberg maintains the simultaneous yes and no position with 
respect to God. God is present and active in the present, but only as the 
conception of the future in unity with the present and past. It is as if we can 
experience God only in a partial, incomplete, not yet way. In contrast to 
Tillich, Pannenberg suggests that "being" is to be thought of from the point of 
view of the future rather than as the ultimate, abstract presence in all things. 
"Man participates in God not by flight from the world but by active 
transformation of the world which is the expression of the divine love, the 
power of its future over the present by which it is transformed in the 
direction of the glory of God. 11 l 5 5 We will turn now to an analysis of 
Pannenberg's understanding of God with relation to religion in general. 
Universal History and Religion 
In attempting to understand the phenomenon of religion, Pannenberg 
.~tresses that humanity is composed of historical beings who change with the 
process of history and thus he maintains that only a study of the history of 
religion can provide an adequate analysis of religious experience. I 5 6 In 
describing one's relationship with the divine, Pannenberg suggests that it 
belongs to one's structure to presuppose a mystery of reality which transcends 
one's own finitude and which allows oneself to relate to this mystery as the 
155 Jbid., p. 248. 
156/bid., p. 78. 
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fulfillment of one's own being. 
What is at stake for man in his being referred to that mystery is essentially the 
wholeness of his own being and therefore of the universal truth that unites all 
men, as well as the unity of the world and the correspondence of his existence with 
this, it follows that this mystery will confront him particularly in events which 
illuminate a wider range of his experience of existence and in fact will encounter 
him as a power over at least one aspect of his existence and of his world as a whole. 
157 
For Pannenberg, happenings of divine reality are historical events. He says, 
"As powerful events they - or the power experienced in them - illuminate the 
experience of existence of the men who encounter such happenings." 1 5 8 
Religions are concerned with this reality which is encountered as experience 
in its totality as the unifying unity which is the world. If this experience 
manifests itself in a personal mode, it is called "God. 11 159 Here we see one of the 
significant differences between Tillich's ontological emphasis on what one 
experiences as divine reality, and Pannenberg's effort to show how one 
experiences God as manifest in the world by focusing on the universal 
structure of history. For Pannenberg, it is one's particular historical situation 
which shapes the conceptions of the divine.160 Naturally, political or social 
differences and changes in culture play a great role in this since religion is 
•· ·'* £oncerned with understanding the world in its wholeness. 
In the face of a growing awareness of the shear multiplicity which 
151 Jbid., p. 104. 
158/bid., p. 105. 
15 9The substance is elaborated by Tillich's ontological focus on being - the manifestation 
of it is elaborated by Pannenberg's focus on the universal structure of history. 
160This theme relates to Tillich's method of correlation - for Tillich it is humanity's 
particular situation which shapes the question that one asks - it is the Christian tradition 
which provides an answer. For Pannenberg, it is the historical situation which shapes 
both the questions one can ask as well as the answers that arise. 
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exists with regard to the variety of religions and cultures both in the world 
today as well as the past, Pannenberg asserts that "it should be tested in every 
case to what extent the underlying experience of the divine mystery expressed 
in a religious phenomenon is able to illuminate the reality of existence as it 
was experienced then and as it presents itself in contemporary experience, 
and therewith to confirm its claim to open up an access to the divine 
mystery." 161 
Universal History and Secular Culture 
In his book Christianity in a Secularized World , Pannenberg, relying 
on the work of the American sociologist Peter Berger, suggests that the 
process of the development of secular culture in the sense of the constant 
advance of 'modernization' necessarily comes up against inner limits.162 This 
theory maintains that secularization cannot count on an unlimited increase as 
Max Weber had previously assumed. Berger believes that the inner limit of 
,. secularization exists as the individual's need for a meaningful life. He says, 
"individuals need to interpret the reality in which they live in a meaningful 
,,~ay, in order to be able to feel that their own life is meaningful." 16 3 
The greatest difficulty with a secularized culture is in its inability to 
allow individuals to recognize meaning in their lives. This characteristic 
stems, primarily, from an anonymous atmosphere that exists in the 
contemporary workplace. By playing their particular roles in the workplace, 
161 Ba sic., vol. II, p. 118. 
162wolfhart Pannenberg, Christianity in a Secularized World (New York: Crossroad, 
1989), p. 28. 
163 Jbid., p. 29. 
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individuals remain largely anonymous. Also, few are able to perceive the 
growing complexity that exists between their particular job and its 
significance and interconnections with the whole of society. Thus, again a 
sense of anonymity exists with respect to entire social system. Further, the 
bureaucratic control over social life. which regards the individual as an 
abstract category and neglects to take note of one's particular individuality, 
reinforces this situation. Finally, the pluralization of the world, the division 
between public and private spheres, and the plurality of institutions within 
the public sphere, which become individual worlds in themselves, lead to a 
disintegration of the world as a whole. Whereas religion used to function as a 
way of maintaining integration in life, the whole of the burden has been 
placed increasingly on the individual. This situation, according to Berger, 
leads to frustration, crisis of identity. and the feeling of "homelessness" in the 
social world. Even religion itself has lost its ability to provide integration and 
wholeness in family life and culture because of the increasing awareness of 
religious plurality. For Pannenberg, the question is: 
Whether there can be a renewal of the context of our culture with its religious 
origins which preserves the values of the modem cultural development while at the 
same time taking more notice of the Christian shaping of our cultural and political 
life and restoring its validity as an index of the identity of our culture?l 64 
For Pannenberg there is hope. He suggests that the most obvious and 
effective way of achieving this would be to strengthen the identity of our 
culture by focusing on its religious roots. What is necessary is the return of 
the view that God is the creator of the world and thus all phenomena of finite 
164/bid., p. 38. 
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reality, including human being, is appropriately understood only in light of 
its relationship to God. This, for Pannenberg, is "the principal counter-
position to the secular consciousness which theology has to develop and 
defend in critical dialogue with the natural sciences and the humanities. 11 I 6 5 
He goes on to say that "theology, in dialogue with the sciences, has the task of 
demonstrating in specific terms the dimension which has thus been omitted 
from the phenomenon which the sciences are investigating, through which 
these phenomena are associated with God as the creator of the world. 11 I 6 6 
Pannenberg maintains that he has attempted to do the same with the 
humanities and strongly believes that it is also possible with the natural 
sciences. Finally he stresses that 
The opportunity for Christianity and its theology is to integrate the reduced 
understanding of reality on the part of the secular culture and its picture of 
human nature into a greater whole, to offer the reduced rationality of secular 
culture a greater breadth of reason, which would also include the horizon of the 
bond between humankind and God.16 7 
It is this task which Pannenberg's theory of universal history strives to 
accomplish. 
'j 
By beginning with truth and moving through Christ, hermeneutic, 
faith and reason, God, and religion, we have analyzed the significant aspects of 
Pannenberg's understanding of universal history as revelation. In the final 
section, we briefly looked at the practical application of Pannenberg's theory 
of universal history to secular culture. In the next and final chapter we will 
165 /bid., p. 52. 
166/bid., p. 52. 
1611bid., p. 57. 
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examine both Tillich's understanding of revelation as ultimate concern and 
Pannenberg's understanding of revelation as universal history in light of our 
initial analysis of revelation in the first chapter. After a more objective 
analysis of their thought is made we will look at them together and consider 
the possibility of using significant elements of both to provide a more 
adequate understanding of the revelation of God in the world today . 
. ' 
CHAPTER IV 
REVELATION AS UNIVERSAL ULTIMATE CONCERN IN HISTORY 
As I have maintained throughout, all theological thought has a theory 
of revelation as its foundation. In focusing on the unveiling of the divine, 
any thought of revelation must ask who, what, where, when, why and how? It 
is clear from the first chapter that the various understandings of the answers 
to these questions are tremendously diverse, almost chaotic. Is it that 
revelation is simply too complex and unknowable to adequately define in 
conceptual terms, or have the many attempts to devise a theory which attempts 
to define and explain the experience of this reality been erroneous? There is a 
third alternative. I am convinced that knowing is a process; a process that will 
continue as long as we are bound by the limiting constraints of finitude. 
Humanity continually strives to grasp the answers to the questions implied in 
I 
the experience of all reality. At best, however, these answers are only 
provisional in the sense that they look ahead or beyond that which is 
apprehended.168 Despite the fact that we are unable to grasp the meaning of 
any experience fully, we continually strive to establish increasingly adequate 
theories that attempt to do so. Why? Beside the will to survive, the desire to 
168The Latin videre means to see -- providere means to see ahead. 
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understand is among our strongest attributes. 
In this final chapter I will attempt to provide a helpful contribution to 
this process within contemporary theological thought about revelation. I will 
begin by focusing on the initial analysis of revelation in chapter one and 
attempt to identify the significant elements that any theory attempting to 
adequately account for the experience of revelation should contain. I will 
then evaluate the understanding of revelation as ultimate concern in Tillich 
and universal history in Pannenberg in light of this previous examination, 
pointing out those elements which are most helpful in attempting to 
understand the experience of revelation and those which are inadequately 
represented in their thought. In the final section, I will consider whether or 
not a new theory, which incorporates the helpful contributions of both Tillich 
and Pannenberg, while better accounting for elements not adequately 
represented in their individual thought, can provide a more adequate account 
of the contemporary experience of revelation. 
Essential Elements in the Experience of the Reality of Revelation 
. ' In our initial discussion of revelation in chapter one we looked at a wide 
variety of ways in which the experience of revelation can be understood. 
Underlying every theory is the conclusion that the conceptual term 
revelation refers to a recognizable and distinct aspect of reality which can be 
experienced. What varies from theory to theory are the conditions and limits 
which are established in attempts to define conceptual terms more clearly. 
What the characteristics of the aspects of reality which are identified with the 
term "revelation" are; when these aspects are experienced; where these 
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aspects are experienced; in whom these aspects are experienced; how these 
aspects are experienced; and finally why these aspects are experienced are 
the questions to be addressed. 
We have seen from the analysis in the first chapter that the 
understanding of these conditions varies considerably from thinker to 
thinker. In what follows, I will attempt to identify conceptual limits of what, 
when, where, in whom, how and why with regard to the concept of revelation. 
I will begin by briefly explaining the question and offering an example from 
our initial discussion of revelation in general from chapter one. Next I will 
evaluate Tillich's and Pannenberg's answer to the question pointing out their 
significant strengths and weaknesses. Finally I will suggest that by 
considering aspects of both Tillich and Pannenberg, a more adequate 
understanding of the contemporary experience of revelation will result. 
What? 
Any theory attempting to understand revelation must evaluate what is 
being experienced. In chapter one, this is most clearly seen in the existential, 
ontological thought of Macquarrie. According to Macquarrie, revelation is the 
' 
experience of being. A condition of the experience of this reality is that it is 
not a thing but rather is necessary for anything to exist. Another condition 
defining the experience of revelation is its transcendence in the sense that it 
does not participate in the subject/object structure of temporal spatial reality. 
Thus the experience of being is more like a presence and manifestation within 
our experience of immanent things. This experience demands involvement, 
participation and concern. 
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Tillich, like Macquarrie. understands revelation as the reality of being 
itself which does not function within the subject/object structure of reality. 
It is the unconditional, infinite, transcendent, essential foundation of all that 
exists. Being itself is that which influences the essential structure of our 
being. In the negative sense, it is understood as the threat of non-being. In 
the positive sense, it is understood as an ultimate concern. 
In the psyche, being itself is experienced as ecstasy ("standing outside 
oneself").169 In humanity's finite situation, being itself is understood as that 
which bridges the gap between the finite and the infinite. In the existential 
situation, being itself is represented by Christ as the essential/existential New 
Being. In humanity's combined finite/existential situation, being itself is 
understood with the symbol of the divine Spirit which manifests itself in the 
human spirit. In history, being itself is understood by means of the symbol of 
the Kingdom of God which itself has both inner and trans-historical aspects. 
For Tillich, being itself remains relatively static in history despite the 
dynamic nature of both history and human nature. In this sense, being itself 
takes on a universal character. Despite the universal character of being itself, 
humanity is limited by non-being (finitude). The experience of being in the 
face of non-being in the positive sense involves couragel 70, in the negative 
I 
sense, anxiety. 
One of the strengths of Tillich's understanding of what revelation is lies 
in his focus on the manifestation of revelation in the present within 
particular experiences of the individual. This experience is open to all people, 
169The following five descriptions of being itself in the thought of Tillich come from our 
analysis of the five books of his Systematic Theology. 
I 70see Tillich's excellent discussion of this in his work The Courage to Be (Yale 
University Press, 1952). 
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at any time. with any thing, person, or event. It discloses a universal, 
limitless. all pervading reality which is experienced in the now. This 
understanding of God in the present is grounded in the Hebrew Scriptures. 
Yahweh was revealed to Moses as "I Am" rather than as "I Was" or "I Will Be." 
Tillich's conception of revelation as humanity's ultimate concern in the face 
of being provides a good explanation of what is experienced as revelation in 
present things, people, and events. Tillich, however, is less concerned with 
the value of revelation that has been experienced in the past and will be 
experienced in the future for people in the present. Despite the fact that the 
experience of revelation in present things, people, and events is essential. it is 
just as important to consider the present experience of past experience and 
potential experience. Pannenberg's eschatological understanding of what the 
reality of revelation is attempts to do just that. 
Whereas Tillich is primarily concerned with the experience of present 
things. people, and events; Pannenberg is concerned with the experience of 
revelation in the past, present and future. For Pannenberg, revelation is a 
single, unified, universal reality which stretches the span of history. He 
describes this universal history as truth itself. The essence of this truth is the 
very process of history. The meaning of any particular event, person, thing, 
' 
depends upon an understanding of the whole of this reality. In order to 
understand what things mean in the present, we need to know what they 
meant in the past and in the future. This essential future · orientation is 
fulfilled with the resurrection of Christ. 
God, for Pannenberg, is the experience of universal history in a 
personal way. This understanding of God is not concerned with past events, 
chronological records, but with the inquiry and discovery of a universal, 
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comprehensive, continuity of meaning which connects all things, events, and 
people. What revelation is, for Pannenberg, is the limited, questionable, 
incomplete disclosure of reality in its wholeness. It is something humanity 
must continually strive to understand and experience. 
A strength of Pannenberg's understanding of what revelation is lies in 
emphasis on the whole of reality: past, present and future. Clearly a focus on 
the present is important, but without recognizing past experience and 
potential experience, it is not possible to adequately understand present 
experience. Pannenberg is much more concerned with the manifestation of 
revelation within humanity as a whole and experience in general (involving 
eschatology). Pannenberg has a more difficult time accounting for the depth 
of the revelatory experience. 
Both Tillich and Pannenberg understand revelation to be a universal, 
ultimate reality. What differs are the aspects of reality each has chosen to 
focus on. Tillich provides the necessary depth of understanding for the 
experience of revelation in the present, while Pannenberg provides the 
necessary breadth for understanding revelation throughout all of history. I 
suggest that a more adequate understanding of the experience of revelation 
should include the depth of Tillich's ontological focus and the breadth of 
' 
Pannenberg's eschatological focus. Thus, revelation is the experience of 
being itself as humanity's ultimate concern within the universal continuity of 
truth including the present as well as past and potential things, people and 
events. The experience of revelation is not only humanity's ultimate concern 
nor universal history but is best understood as a universal history of ultimate 
concern. The experience of revelation is adequately described with ontology, 
but without considering ontological experience in the past or possible 
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experience of the future, the understanding looses its universal, holistic 
perspective necessary for a truly adequate understanding of the experience. 
Thus, the understanding of revelation in either Tillich or Pannenberg alone 
does not account for the experience of revelation as well as a theory which 
emphasizes the focused ontological aspects of Tillich and the broad 
eschatological aspects of Pannenberg together. 
When? 
Understanding when the experience of revelation occurs is also an 
essential element in attempting to understand it. Within this category there 
seems to be much more diversity. This diversity is clearly illustrated from 
chapter one in the typological survey of Dulles' Models of Revelation. Those 
who maintain Dulles' doctrinal model assert that revelation occurs when one 
comes in contact with ecclesial authority, dogma, and scripture. In the 
historical model, revelation occurs either when one comes in contact with 
individual historical deeds, persons, events and traditions or, as in the case of 
Pannenberg, when one apprehends history in its universal, comprehensive, 
totality. In the inner experiential model, revelation occurs when one comes in 
' 
contact with God as a reality communicated within the soul of the individual. 
In the fourth model, revelation occurs in history, personal experience, and 
doctrines only when God chooses to be present to those who have faith. And 
finally, in the fifth model, revelation occurs when human consciousness is 
raised to the level of being able to apprehend the experience of being through 
all things. 
For Tillich, clearly revelation occurs when one comes in contact with 
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any thing which has entered the special conditions of a revelatory 
constellation. Events, people, language, things (e.g. rocks, trees, stars, etc.) 
doctrine, and history can become media of revelation. It is essential to 
recognize that it is never the thing itself which is revelatory, rather it is 
being itself which uses these things as a mode of expression. Tillich wants to 
be sure that God is not identified within this world. His position puts some 
distance between humanity and God. Our understanding of God is ambiguous as 
long as we are finite. For Tillich the problem is humanity's inability to 
understand the ultimate (essence) from a limited perspective (existence). The 
significance of Christ is in his ability paradoxically to exist essentially. The 
experience of Christ teaches Christians how to exist more and more essentially. 
For Tillich, this experience of Christ must be existential and ontological, and 
consequently cannot only be historicat.171 
A strength of Tillich's position is in his ability to express the 
accessibility of the reality of revelation. It is experienced whenever one 
experiences any aspect of reality. Revelation understood as one's ultimate 
concern in the face of the experience of being itself, expresses its ultimate, 
essential, omnipotent character. Christ is the existential experience of the 
coming together of existence and essence. 
' 
Although Tillich stresses the 
necessity of understanding the history (existence) of Jesus as well as the being 
(essence) of Christ, he is not as concerned with viewing the experience of any 
ultimate concern in the continuity of its universal history. Tillich provides an 
essential explanation of revelation as an experience which occurs whenever 
one has an ultimate concern regarding any aspect of reality, but he is not as 
1 71 Recall that historical experience, for Tillich, is objective and is limited by finitude. 
Thus the experience of the finite/infinite nature of Christ must be existential. 
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concerned with the necessity of viewing this experience of ultimate concern 
in the continuity of universal history. Pannenberg suggests that the 
experience of revelation occurs only when one understands history in its 
totality. 
For Pannenberg, revelation occurs only when one is able to conceive of 
the universal, comprehensive unity of reality of history. Similar to Tillich, 
Pannenberg also suggests that human finitude prevents a complete 
understanding of revelation because humanity is unable to understand history 
in its totality (one cannot fully understand the future). For Christians, a 
provisional understanding of God is possible with the eschatological reality of 
Christ whose resurrected reality provides a glimpse of the future history. This 
understanding of reality (universal history), even though limited, is required 
if one desires to understand the meaning of any particular event, thing, or 
person. 
A strength of Pannenberg's position is in his emphasis that an 
experience of revelation occurs only when one understands history in its 
fullness. Christ becomes a disclosure of the future which breaks into the past 
and allows people in the present to grasp a provisional view of the whole of 
history which is necessary for one to understand the meaning of any 
' 
particular aspect of reality. Although Pannenberg emphasizes the value of 
conceiving of a universal history in the understanding revelation, he is less 
concerned with accounting for the experience of revelation in particular 
things within universal history. 
The moment when revelation occurs, according to Tillich and 
Pannenberg, differs because they focus on different aspects of reality. For 
Tillich, it occurs when one experiences the ontological reality of being. For 
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Pannenberg it occurs when one views history in its totality. Consequently, 
their corresponding conceptions of the meaning of Christ differ as well. 
Tillich emphasizes the value of the existential experience of Christ while 
Pannenberg focuses on the eschatological experience. I suggest that a more 
complete understanding of revelation should emphasis ontological as well as 
historical aspects. This universal ultimate concern in history maintains that 
the fullest understanding of revelation occurs when one focuses on the 
ontological reality of ultimate concern within the universal continuity of 
history. Also, the meaning of Christ is best understood when one understands 
him as an existential experience bringing together existence and essence as 
well as the eschatological experience providing a glimpse of the future. 
Viewing revelation as a universally ultimate historical concern provides a 
more adequate understanding of when the experience of revelation occurs. 
Where? 
Where revelation occurs is also an essential element in attempting to 
understand it. This category involves the complex interrelation between an 
immanent experience of reality and a transcendent experience of reality. I 
' 
have been using the term "reality" to denote the whole of human experience. 
Both immanent reality and transcendent reality exist and consequently are 
real. Those aspects of reality which are immanent are limited by the 
conditions of time and space and participate within the relationship between 
subject and object. Those which are transcendent do not. The complexity of 
where revelation occurs is addressed in chapter one in Niebuhr's discussion of 
internal and external history. As you recall, for Niebuhr, revelation occurs as 
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faith or, the recognition of meaning and unity, in the personal lives of 
members within a community. Thus "internal history" is a transcendent 
experience in the lives of people. For Niebuhr, the transcendent experience 
of inner history depends upon what he calls "external history." External 
history involves the impersonal objects, ideas, and happenings that form the 
foundation and structure of the world in which we live, communicate, and 
function. Thus, external history is the experience of the immanent foundation 
and structure of finite reality. We have also seen in chapter one that Kaufman 
too maintains the significance of the reality of revelation being experienced 
within the correlation between historical and existential elements. For him, 
the first norm of revelation stresses revelation in history, scripture, tradition, 
and doctrine. The second norm focuses on revelation in contemporary 
ontological experience. 
For Tillich, an ultimate concern emerges when one experiences the 
transcendent reality of being itself within immanent reality. The reality of 
what is revealed is not part of the subject/object structure of immanent 
reality. But because humanity lives, functions and thinks within immanent 
reality, any experience of the transcendent reality of revelation must involve 
immanent experience. 
' 
Tillich does caution against being ultimately 
concerned with only immanent things without reference to the transcendent 
component of the reality of being itself. This is what he calls the demonic. 
Because of human finitude, humanity is unable to fully grasp being itself 
within the subject/object structure of reality. Within history, revelation is 
understood with the symbol of the Kingdom of God. Just as the transcendent 
reality of being itself is understood to be mediated through the immanent 
reality of the present, the Kingdom of God is understood to have a trans-
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historical side. which when manifest within immanent history. is understood 
as inner history. This trans-historical side allows the symbol of the Kingdom 
of God to answer the questions implied in the ambiguities of the dynamics of 
history. For Tillich the central manifestation of the Kingdom is in the Christ. 
A strength of Tillich's ontological understanding of revelation is in his 
ability to maintain the closeness of revelation. Also. with ontology he is able 
to stress the unlimited. ultimate, omnipotent presence of the divine. He is able 
to describe God as the foundation of all things. the creator of all things, as that 
which is ultimate for all to experience. There is no doubt that Tillich's 
understanding of the reality of revelation is adequately represented with his 
understanding of being itself. However, Tillich has a more difficult time 
expressing how the dynamic process of history, involving humanity in the 
finite condition, relates to the ultimate experience of revelation. For Tillich, 
history finally becomes transparent to the disclosure of that which is beyond 
being and non-being. One could argue that Tillich neglects the significance 
of immanent reality and the history of this reality in order to preserve the 
ultimate transcendent reality of revelation. I think this is the case because 
Tillich, from the start, has been more concerned with what the reality of 
revelation is rather than where or how it is experienced. Pannenberg, on the 
' 
other hand, is more concerned with expressing how the experience of 
revelation must include an understanding of the process of history. History. 
for Pannenberg, is an event which is shared by the individual and God. 
For Pannenberg, revelation as universal history is an experience of 
immanent reality. He recognizes that all human experience is limited by 
finitude, and thus, any experience of revelation is finite and concerned with 
immanent reality. Pannenberg is clearly less "Platonically idealistic" than 
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Tillich in his view of reality. Whereas Tillich was able to maintain the 
"purity" or ultimacy of the reality of revelation with ontological categories, 
Pannenberg does so by stressing that our experience of the reality is a process 
that is not yet complete. The whole exists, but we, because of the limits of 
finitude, are unable to fully recognize it. For Pannenberg, the essence of 
truth is one. There is no experience which is not an element of revelation. 
Revelation does not occur behind things, above things, or through things: all 
things, events, and people, when understood in the continuity of meaning of 
universal history, are elements of revelation. This understanding of 
revelation necessarily includes a conception of the future in order to complete 
the whole of history. This is fulfilled with the eschatological reality of Christ. 
Humanity participates in God, with Christ, not by looking away from the world 
but by transforming the world in the direction of God. 
The significant strength of Pannenberg's view of where revelation 
occurs is that he is able to maintain "as all things" rather than "beyond all 
things." With Pannenberg, there is a stress in the value of immanent reality. 
The underlying theme of his theology is that the limited human condition is 
all we have right now, don't abandon it.172 Because of this focus, Pannenberg 
insists that theology be concerned with the research and results of all 
I 
academic disciplines. For him, God is the creator of all things and is one. 
Pannenberg manages to express the tremendous value of all things as well as 
the value of viewing reality in it comprehensiveness. He has a more difficult 
time expressing the depth of reality. Because of this he is unable to express 
how, if possible, one can experience God in particular things apart from the 
1720ne could criticize Tillich for setting up the Platonic dichotomy stressing the good of 
the transcendent and the illusion and imperfection of the immanent. 
94 
continuity of history. The problem that inevitably results from this position is 
that it is unable to explain how billions of people, who are unable to learn, or 
comprehend universal history, are able to experience God.17 3 Although I 
think it is essential to comprehend universal history in attempting to grasp 
the experience of revelation in the fullest possible way, I believe that it is also 
necessary to stress that the experience of revelation can occur in particular 
things apart from a conception of universal history. 
Both Tillich and Pannenberg are careful to stress humanity's 
Ii m itedness. Although both maintain that the experience of revelation is 
possible, they are insistent that this experience is incomplete. By focusing on 
different aspects of reality, Tillich and Pannenberg explain this dialectical 
presence of God in different ways; Tillich with ontology. Pannenberg with 
history and eschatology. Tillich discusses the more universal, idealistic 
ontological experience which is manifest within things, people and events, 
while Pannenberg stresses the value of things, people and events themselves 
within their historical continuity. I suggest that the fullest, most adequate 
understanding of revelation should include Tillich's focus on the reality of 
revelation within all things as the ontological experience of ultimate concern 
as well as the experience of a universal history of all things in the continuity 
' 
that reveals their ultimate meaning. I suggest that one can, in a more than 
necessarily limited way, experience revelation either by having an ultimate 
concern or by recognizing the universal structure of history. However, I 
believe the most adequate and fullest understanding of revelation should focus 
on the ontological reality of being itself leading to ultimate concerns as well as 
17311 seems to me that in many cases it is the people who are the poorest and who know the 
least of universal history who have the strongest faith and experience of revelation. 
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a focus on the ultimate value of the historical process of immanent reality 
which leads to a universal conception of reality. 
Who? 
When attempting to understand revelation, it is important to consider 
who experiences it. For the most part, this category involves the conditions 
established in the other categories. For example, Macquarrie maintains that 
revelation occurs in the one who experiences the mood of anxiety; for the 
doctrinal advocates it. is the one whose heart is open to the spirit of God; for 
those maintaining the dialectical presence its the one who has faith and whom 
God chooses to be revealed. It is clear from chapter one that all theories of 
revelation maintain that all of humanity is capable of experiencing 
revelation. For Tillich, the one who comes in contact with the reality of being 
itself experiences an ultimate concern. All people are capable of having 
ultimate concern. For Pannenberg, any person able to comprehend reality in 
its totality of its past, present, and future, can experience revelation. All 
people are capable of viewing history universally. 
Both Tillich and Pannenberg maintain that revelation can be 
experienced by all people. Tillich's suggests that people having an ultimate 
concern in the face of being itself experience revelation. For Pannenberg, it 
is those people who have an understanding of universal history that 
experience revelation. I suggest that it is people who have an ultimate 
universal historical concern who experience revelation. 
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How? 
How revelation is experienced is another tremendously complex and 
highly diversified category. Whether revelation is concerned with 
propositional truth, historical truth or personal truth, there are two general 
ways the reality of revelation is thought to be experienced: either mediated or 
immediate. Propositions, history, and personal experience are either thought 
to be revelation or mediate revelation. The question is whether the reality of 
revelation is immanent or transcendent. If immanent, then how one 
experiences it is concerned with determining which aspects of immanent 
reality are revelation. If transcendent, then how one experiences it is 
concerned with which immanent aspects of reality mediate transcendent 
reality. 
The following are examples of mediated and immediate revelation as 
propositional, historical, and personal experience. Dulles' propositional model 
suggests that doctrine mediates the supernatural revelation of God. On the 
other hand, contemporary Christian fundamentalism maintains that doctrine, 
particularly biblical scripture, is a direct immediate revelation. They are not 
concerned with attempting to identify what is revealed through the Bible 
' 
because the what and the Bible are one and the same. With regard to history, 
Kaufman maintains that revelation is conveyed through tradition which 
functions as a medium of the ontological reality of revelation. Pannenberg, 
on the other hand, maintains that history, when viewed from a universal 
perspective, is an immediate experience of revelation. All human experience 
falls within the bounds of universal history. Finally, with regard to personal 
experience, Schleiermacher, for example, maintains that revelation is 
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mediated through the person and is experienced as the feeling of dependence 
upon God. Ascetics, on the other hand. maintain that there is no distinction 
between the person and the reality of God: they are one and the same. 
How revelation is understood. immediate or mediate, is presented by 
Cook as discussed in chapter one. He maintains that the process of 
understanding the complex interrelationships between propositional truth, 
historical truth, personal truth, transcendent truth, and immanent truth, is 
metaphoric. For Cook, understanding the revelatory process involves 
metaphor, story, and symbol because of the narrative quality of all human 
experience. This use of metaphoric process attempts to explain how it is that 
one can know, interpret, and understand revelation. 
Tillich understands the reality of revelation to be transcendent. 
although it manifests itself through immanent reality. 
infinite, transcendent reality is manifest in finite reality. 
The unconditional, 
Because being itself 
is transcendent and manifest through immanent reality, it is only possible to 
discuss it by using symbols. According to Tillich, symbols have the ability to 
participate within immanent reality but yet can point to the transcendent. 
Symbolic language manages to bridge the gap between the finite and infinite. 
Thus all talk of God and to God must use symbols. According to him, we could 
not communicate with God if he were only ultimate being. In our relationship 
with him, we encounter him with the highest of what we are -- person. In 
speaking and thinking of, and to, God with symbols we can involve our limited 
(finite) nature with the unlimited (infinite) nature of God. For Tillich, the 
reality of the personal is not confined to the limits of finitude. we are. Because 
we are finite, our experience of the personal is limited. Thus in speaking of 
God as unlimited and personal. the problem is not with God being infinitely 
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personal but with humanity's attempt to understand this conceptually .1 1 4 
Tillich attempts to avoid this by suggesting that God can only be thought of 
symbolically. Remember that for Tillich, symbols are able to participate 
within limits of finitude while pointing to the infinite. 
A strength in Tillich's understanding of how we experience revelation 
is that it is able to maintain that God is ultimate and infinite and is separate 
from humanity which is limited, but at the same time, is closer to humanity 
than we are to ourselves and is able to communicate with us. Tillich's view 
explains how it is that God can be ultimate and omnipotent on the one hand 
and allow humanity the complete freedom of choice on the other. If God were 
"automatically" experienced like a tree, humanity would have no choice but to 
know God. But by suggesting that God is present only to those who desire his 
presence allows humanity to freely choose their destiny. For Tillich, the 
experience of revelation requires faith. Clearly Tillich's focus is on this 
transcendent experience of revelation. However if the only means of 
experiencing revelation is through finite reality, then finite reality is just as 
important as transcendent in understanding revelation. For this needed 
emphasis on the immediate experience of the finite, we tum to Pannenberg. 
Pannenberg maintains that there is no experience of reality outside the 
limits of finitude. Thus, all experience of reality. including the reality of 
revelation, is immediate. Because of finitude, humanity needs to use symbols 
when referring to God. But rather than suggesting that the individual has a 
difficult time grasping the infinite through the finite, Pannenberg suggests 
that the whole of reality, which reveals God, is not yet known. In order for 
l 74Recall that for Tillich conceptual understanding necessarily involves the finite limits 
of time and space. 
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one to experience revelation, it is necessary to understand the continuity of 
truth which is history. It is not possible to narrow mindedly attempt to 
understand a particular perspective (stemming from the experience of a 
present event, person, thing) apart from the whole of truth. Pannenberg 
suggests that we must look beyond the particular, precise focus of the 
scientific method and view reality with the more comprehensive horizon of 
history. Within this universal history, however, Pannenberg insists that the 
results of scientific research be included. History without the precise, 
particular focus of science lacks depth; while history without the 
comprehensive, unifying, continuity of truth lacks meaning. 
Pannenberg perceives a problem with how contemporary secular 
culture views the experience of reality. He suggests that the problem stems 
from erroneous conviction that particular, empirical, scientific data is the 
limit of experience. What much of contemporary secular culture has lost by 
focusing almost exclusively on science is the meaning which comes from a 
more comprehensive view of reality. The rectification of this problem does 
not concern humanity's ability to experience the meaning of revelation, but 
with convincing people of the veracity of revelatory experience and teaching 
them the language with which to understand it (myth, metaphor, symbol). By 
showing that science is part of a more comprehensive reality that makes up a 
universal history, Pannenberg hopes to expand the horizon of experience for 
contemporary culture. 
A strength of Pannenberg's understanding of how revelation is 
experienced is that it demonstrates the need for an understanding of a 
comprehensive horizon of experience in order to grasp revelation. This 
comprehension is developed, in part, by adding scientific depth to the breadth 
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of universal history. Most importantly though is the need to understand the 
whole of history in light of an eschatological focus on a provisional future. 
This provisional future similarly adds an element of faith in Pannenberg's 
understanding of the experience of revelation. 
Both Tillich and Pannenberg suggest that because of human finitude, 
the experience of revelation requires faith and the use of symbol. Their focus, 
however, is on different aspects of reality. Tillich's, on the transcendent; 
Pannenberg's, on the immanent. I suggest that a better understanding of 
revelation is possible by combining aspects of both views. Tillich's focus on 
the transcendent aspects of revelation would provide additional 
comprehension to Pannenberg's universal history. Pannenberg's focus on 
aspects of immanent reality would provide the needed emphasis on medium 
through which revelation is received. Understanding revelation as an 
ultimate universally historical concern would provide a more authentic 
explanation of how we experience the reality of revelation. 
Why? 
The final question that must be dealt with if an adequate understanding 
of revelation is to be made is why is it experienced? In light of our analysis of 
revelation in chapter one, it is clear that there are fewer attempts to answer 
the question of why. The clearest response in Dulles' models is within the 
understanding of revelation as new awareness. This model suggests that we 
experience revelation because it is who we are. As a result of a more advanced 
stage of human consciousness we have come to realize the divine presence 
within us. Why do we experience revelation is the same as asking why do we 
' 
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experience a tree -- because we are able, and it exists. 
For Tillich, we experience revelation because we are a mixture of being 
and non-being. Asking the questions involved in being implies that there is 
something about being which we do not possess, otherwise we would not ask 
the question. Also, there is something of being which we do possess which 
allows us to make it the object of a question. Thus, part of who we are involves 
this ultimate reality which is a part of everything but yet never merely a 
thing. Being itself is the ground and substance of our being and the being of 
all things. We must strive to experience revelation because it is our ultimate 
concern. 
A strength of Tillich's view is that it emphasizes the essence of God 
within all of creation. Because of this essential presence in all reality, 
humanity's ultimate concern is the experience of revelation. In order to 
understand more fully who we are, we need to recognize the continuity of 
truth within universal history. 
For Pannenberg, we experience revelation as universal history because 
it is the only way we can understand the meaning of any particular aspect of 
reality. Humanity has an innate need to recognize meaning in life. This 
meaning can only be understood by grasping the continuity of truth which 
forms the substance of universal history. Whether one is interested in 
grasping the meaning of a thing, person, event, or word, it is necessary to 
have an understanding of universal history. 
A strength in Pannenberg's view is that it recognizes that an 
understanding of humanity's historical identity is important in recognizing 
meaning in life. The comprehensiveness of universal history is humanity's 
ultimate concern. 
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Both Tillich and Pannenberg suggest that the experience of revelation 
is essential and of ultimate value in life. I suggest that a better understanding 
of why humanity experiences revelation can obtained by looking at aspects of 
both Tillich and Pannenberg. By including Pannenberg's focus on universal 
history, Tillich's understanding of the essence of revelation in all creation is 
expanded to include the whole of history. By including Tillich's focus on the 
potential for all things to be of ultimate concern, Pannenberg's understanding 
of the value of historical identity is deepened to include the depth of being. 
We desire to experience revelation because it discloses our depth of being 
within the whole of history. 
Concluding Thoughts 
In this thesis I began with a general analysis of revelation. I began 
with Dulles' typological survey of revelation. Next, I turned to Bailie in an 
attempt to gain some historical perspective. I then refered to Niebuhr, 
Macquarrie, Kaufman, and Cook in order to lay out some of the significant 
details of thought about revelation. I turned to an analysis of revelation 
pnderstood as ultimate concern in the thought of Tillich and as universal 
history in the thought of Pannenberg. And finally, in this section I have 
analyzed the various ways that the experience of the reality of revelation can 
be conceptualized. Also, I have discussed the significant aspects of Tillich's 
and Pannenberg's understanding of revelation in relation to these categories. 
I pointed out the significant strengths and weaknesses of both Tillich and 
Pannenberg with regard to these categories. Finally, I have suggested a new 
way to understanding the experience of revelation which involves elements of 
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thought in both Tillich and Pannenberg. I suggest that this new 
understanding of revelation accounts for the experience of revelation more 
adequately than either Tillich's or Pannenberg's theory alone. Revelation is 
the cornerstone of all theological thought. By providing a general discussion 
of the various ways it has been understood, as well as a focused analysis of the 
way in which Tillich understands it as ultimate concern and Pannenberg as 
universal history, and finally by suggesting that an understanding of 
revelation which includes elements from Tillich and Pannenberg would allow 
for a more adequate understanding, I have contributed to the on going 
discussion of the meaning and experience of the reality of revelation in the 
world today. 
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